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Abstract
Although empirical scholarship dominates the field of law and finance, much of it shares a 
common vulnerability: an abiding faith in the accuracy and integrity of a small, specialized 
collection of corporate governance data. In this paper, we unveil a novel collection of three 
decades’ worth of corporate charters for thousands of public companies, which shows that 
this faith is misplaced. 
We make three principal contributions to the literature. First, we label our corpus for a variety 
of firm- and state-level governance features. Doing so reveals significant infirmities within 
the most well-known corporate governance datasets, including an error rate exceeding 
eighty percent in the G-Index, the most widely used proxy for “good governance” in law and 
finance. Correcting these errors substantially weakens one of the most well-known results in 
law and finance, which associates good governance with higher investment returns. Second, 
we make our corpus freely available to others, in hope of providing a long-overdue resource 
for traditional scholars as well as those exploring new frontiers in corporate governance, 
ranging from machine learning to stakeholder governance to the effects of common owner-
ship. Third, and more broadly, our analysis exposes twin cautionary tales about the critical 
role of lawyers in empirical research, and the dubious practice of throttling public access to 
public records.
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Corporate governance lapses are blamed for some of the most ignominious 
business catastrophes in recent history, from Enron’s epic collapse,1 to Wells Fargo’s 
$3 billion fine,2 to the implosions of WeWork3 and Theranos.4 And in the wake of 
each debacle, legions of empirically-minded researchers soon followed,5 marshaling 
mountains of quantitative data to unpack lessons about where governance failed, and 
how we can improve it.6 Their collective efforts have met with a ravenous reception: 
Empirical corporate governance research now dominates the law and finance 
landscape,7 routinely informing government policy,8 real-world practice,9 and vigorous 
academic debate.10 By any reasonable accounting, the topic is a major success story in 
the interdisciplinary study of law. 
 
1 Woodrow W. Clark & Istemi Demirag, Enron: The Failure of Corporate Governance, 8 J. CORP. 
CITIZENSHIP 105, 105 (2002).  
2 Press Release, Department of Justice, Wells Fargo Agrees to Pay $3 Billion to Resolve Crim. & 
Civ. Investigations into Sales Pracs. Involving the Opening of Millions of Accts. Without Customer 
Authorization (Feb. 21, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/wells-fargo-agrees-pay-3-billion-
resolve-criminal-and-civil-investigations-sales-practices. 
3 Michael Peregrine, WeWork and the Value of Effective Governance, FORBES (Sept. 17, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelperegrine/2019/09/17/wework-and-the-value-of-effective-
governance. 
4 Pamela Wasley, The Theranos Crisis: Where Was the Board?, FORBES (Apr. 27, 2016), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/groupthink/2016/04/27/the-theranos-crisis-where-was-the-board. 
5 See generally Robert Bartlett & Eric Talley, Law and Corporate Governance, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF 
THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 177 (Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach 
eds., 2017) (illustrating the importance of empirical data to corporate governance research).  
6 See, e.g., Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 
Q.J. ECON. 107 (2003); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. 
Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998). 
7 La Porta et al.’s interrelated article has been referenced 23,266 times in academic journals, 
including over 650 citations in law review articles. SSRN indicates that Gompers et al.’s article was cited 
9,485 times, including over 175 law review articles. See infra Part I. 
8 See, e.g., Good Faith Determinations of Fair Value, 86 Fed. Reg. 748, 795 (Jan. 6, 2021) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 270); Amendments to Financial Disclosures About Acquired and 
Disposed Businesses, 85 Fed. Reg. 54,002, 54,043 n.442 (Aug. 31, 2020) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pts. 210, 230, 239, 240, 249, 270, 274); Form CRS Relationship Summary; Amendments to Form ADV; 
Required Disclosures in Retail Communications and Restrictions on the Use of Certain Names or Titles, 
83 Fed. Reg. 21,416, 21,442 nn.233–38, 21,485 nn.575–76 (proposed May 9, 2018) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, 275, 279). 
9 See, e.g., CREDIT SUISSE RSCH. INST., HOW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MATTERS 18 (2016), 
https://www.credit-suisse.com/media/assets/corporate/docs/about-us/research/publications/how-
corporate-governance-matters.pdf (advertising an investment strategy using the well-known “G-Index” 
as a factor for picking high performing stocks).  
10 See, e.g., Martijn Cremers & Allen Ferrell, Thirty Years of Shareholder Rights and Firm Value, 69 J. 
FIN. 1167 (2014) (discussed at greater length below); Amir N. Licht, Chanan Goldschmidt & Shalom 
H. Schwartz, Culture, Law, and Corporate Governance, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 229 (2005); William A. 
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And yet a potentially fatal flaw has long lurked just beneath this seemingly 
resplendent facade: shallow data. Many of the preeminent contributions in empirical 
corporate governance depend commonly (and critically) on a surprisingly slender 
stockpile of datasets whose provenance is frustratingly obscure. But virtually no one 
has seriously attempted to gauge the integrity of these pivotal inputs.11  
Until now. In this article, we unveil a new resource that allows researchers—for 
the first time—to investigate the fidelity of foundational corporate governance 
metrics. And the results aren’t pretty. We demonstrate that several of the most heavily 
relied-upon governance datasets suffer from inaccuracies so extensive as to call into 
question some of the landmark insights of the field.  
The resource we unveil is anchored by a first-of-its-kind textual corpus 
representing over a quarter-century’s worth of corporate charters for S&P 1500 listed 
issuers.12 We hand-label13 a significant subset of these full-text documents for 
characteristics that feature prominently in the governance literature. And, rectifying a 
longstanding deficit in the field, we make the corpus publicly available as open-source, 
in the hope that it will catalyze and improve future research. Collectively, we refer to 
 
Reese Jr. & Michael S. Weisbach, Protection of Minority Shareholders Interests, Cross-Listings in the United States, 
and Subsequent Equity Offerings, 66 J. FIN. ECON. 65, 78–79 (2002); Holger Spamann, The “Antidirector 
Rights Index” Revisited, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 467 (2010); Miroslava Straska & H. Gregory Waller, 
Antitakeover Provisions and Shareholder Wealth: A Survey of the Literature, 49 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 933 
(2014). 
11 Most researchers have by and large presumed the integrity of the data, focusing instead on new 
ways to analyze, interpret, or critique its use. See, e.g., Sanjai Baghat & Roberta Romano, Empirical Studies 
of Corporate Law, in HANDBOOK OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 945-1012 (2007); Lucian Bebchuk, Alma 
Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783 (2009) [hereinafter 
Bebchuk et al., What Matters]; Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Charles C.Y. Wang, Learning and the 
Disappearing Association Between Governance and Returns, 108 J. FIN. ECON. 323 (2013) [hereinafter Bebchuk 
et al., Disappearing Association]; Lawrence D. Brown & Marcus L. Caylor, Corporate Governance and Firm 
Valuation, 25 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 409 (2006); John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & Tjomme O. Rusticus, 
Does Weak Governance Cause Weak Stock Returns? An Examination of Firm Operating Performance and Investors’ 
Expectations, 61 J. FIN. 655 (2006); Cremers & Ferrell, supra note 10; Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction 
in Corporate Law and Governance, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1325 (2013); Jonathan M. Karpoff, Robert J. 
Schonlau & Eric W. Wehrly, Do Takeover Defense Indices Measure Takeover Deterrence?, 30 REV. FIN. STUD. 
2359 (2017). 
12 The S&P Composite 1500 Index is a broad-based stock index of U.S.-traded equities designed 
to represent a broad-based market portfolio. It is the aggregation of the S&P 500, the S&P MidCap 
400, and the S&P SmallCap 600, covering approximately 90% of the market capitalization of U.S. 
stocks. See PHILLIP BRZENK, HAMISH PRESTON & AYE SOE, S&P DOW JONES INDICES, THE S&P 
COMPOSITE 1500: AN EFFICIENT MEASURE OF THE U.S. EQUITY MARKET 3 (Dec. 11, 2020),  
https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/documents/research/research-the-sp-composite-1500-an-
efficient-measure-of-the-us-equity-market.pdf.  
13 Labeling is a procedure whereby a third party (typically a natural person with relevant expertise) 
evaluates, ranks, and/or categorizes the substantive content of documents in a corpus. See Todd 
Kulesza, Saleema Amershi, Rich Caruana, Danyel Fisher & Denis Charles, Structured Labeling to 
Facilitate Concept Evolution in Machine Learning 3075 (2014),  
https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.1050.1212&rep=rep1&type=pdf. 
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our raw corpus and labels as the “Cleaning Corporate Governance” (or CCG) 
database. The database provides researchers with an unprecedented capability to 
analyze the composition and structure of the very textual heart of corporate 
governance—certificates of incorporation—across firms, industries, jurisdictions, and 
over time.  
But it is substantially more than that. The CCG also allows researchers—for the 
first time—to reassess foundational insights from law and finance. We use it, for 
example, to show that the ingredients of the most renowned corporate governance 
index in the field, the “G-Index,”14 are riddled with inaccuracies, resulting in an 
estimated error rate exceeding 80%—a rate that gets worse over time. And these 
inaccuracies are not simply garden-variety statistical anomalies. Rather, we 
demonstrate that they unsettle even one of the most beatified results in the field: that 
systematically investing in firms with “good governance” delivers returns that 
significantly eclipse the market. When reanalyzed with corrected data, this result 
changes appreciably. To the extent any part of it survives, it does so in a materially 
attenuated form. 
The value of the CCG is not limited to reassessing prior results in the corporate 
governance literature, however. It also helps lay the foundation for the next chapter 
of corporate governance research at a critical moment, when we stand at the 
crossroads of several new and exciting directions the field might pursue. Machine 
learning and computational text analysis, for example, are becoming increasingly 
prominent in many areas of legal scholarship15 but have yet to gain a significant 
foothold in corporate governance.16 The CCG is ideal for these methodologies, and 
 
14 See Gompers et al., supra note 6. 
15 See, e.g., Jens Frankenreiter & Michael A. Livermore, Computational Methods in Legal Analysis, 16 
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 39 (2020); Kellen Funk & Lincoln A. Mullen, The Spine of American Law: Digital 
Text Analysis and U.S. Legal Practice, 123 AM. HIST. REV. 132 (2018); Michael A. Livermore, Allen B. 
Riddell & Daniel Rockmore, The Supreme Court and the Judicial Genre, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 837 (2017); 
Jonathan Macey & Joshua Mitts, Finding Order in the Morass: The Three Real Justifications for Piercing the 
Corporate Veil, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 99 (2014); Marian Moszoro, Pablo T. Spiller & Sebastian Stolorz, 
Rigidity of Public Contracts, 13 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 396 (2016); Julian Nyarko, Stickiness and Incomplete 
Contracts, 88 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2021); David E. Pozen, Eric L. Talley & Julian Nyarko, A Computational 
Analysis of Constitutional Polarization, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2019); Eric L. Talley, Is the Future of Law a 
Driverless Car?: Assessing How the Data-Analytics Revolution Will Transform Legal Practice, 174 J. 
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 183 (2018); Eric L. Talley & Drew O’Kane, The Measure of a 
MAC: A Machine-Learning Protocol for Analyzing Force Majeure Clauses in M&A Agreements, 168 J. 
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 181 (2012). 
16 The literature applying machine learning to governance is still thin, and very little of it focuses 
on foundational corporate governance documents themselves (due in part to the absence of a corpus 
like the CCG). Cf. Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric L. Talley, Contracting Out of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: An 
Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1075 (2017) (building a targeted 
corpus of corporate opportunity waivers from public filings); Elvis Hernandez-Perdomo, Yilmaz Guney 
& Claudio M. Rocco, A Reliability Model for Assessing Corporate Governance Using Machine Learning Techniques, 
185 RELIABILITY ENG. & SYSTEM SAFETY 220 (2019) (marshaling select financial disclosure items 
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we deploy several of them here. In particular, we use them to corroborate our error-
correction efforts and to shed light on a host of deeper governance questions—
including whether legal origins matter and how governance evolves during periods of 
disruption like the Financial Crisis. The emergent scholarly literature on “common 
ownership” can also benefit from the CCG.17 While this literature raises troubling 
questions about whether large passive investors are conduits for anti-competitive 
behavior, its proponents still struggle to pin down the precise mechanism through 
which passive ownership translates into conscious parallelism.18 The CCG provides an 
intriguing tool for smoking out such a mechanism (if one exists): by dusting for 
fingerprints left at the scene of the crime, as manifested in stockholder rights and 
governance structures in our corpus. Similarly, the CCG can help reveal how 
governance shapes (and is shaped by) the very purpose of the corporation itself, 
particularly as scholars and policy makers take the concept of stakeholder governance 
more seriously.19 Pre-existing governance metrics—which tend to focus exclusively on 
shareholder interests—have little to say about this topic, but the CCG is a ready resource 
for generating new measures that bear directly on non-shareholder constituencies.  
More broadly, this article exposes two systemic issues that should concern 
empirical researchers of all stripes. The first is that corporate governance research has 
a critical need for lawyers and lawyerly judgment. We conjecture that a principal reason 
that data errors have propagated for so long in this field is that lawyers were exiled (or 
relegated themselves) to the back seat of the data aggregation project. In their absence, 
non-lawyers were left to do much of the work, proceeding—best they could—to 
dispense judgments about the effects of formal legal documents, statutes, case law, 
and the like. While perhaps a commendable first effort, such casual empiricism no 
longer suffices. Lawyers can and must play a more central role in empirical corporate 
governance research, reclaiming the function for which they are professionally trained. 
 
related to corporate governance to assess “systems failure” in firms); Ryan Bubb & Emiliano Catan, The 
Party Structure of Mutual Funds (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 560, 2020), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3124039 (using machine learning techniques to study mutual fund voting 
patterns). 
17 See José Azar, Martin C. Schmalz & Isabel Técu, Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership, 73 J. 
FIN. 1513 (2018); Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267 (2016); Eric A. Posner, 
Fiona Scott Morton & E. Glen Weyl, A Proposal to Limit the Anti-Competitive Power of Institutional Investors, 
81 ANTITRUST L.J. 669 (2017); Fiona Scott Morton & Herbert Hovenkamp, Horizontal Shareholding and 
Antitrust Policy, 127 YALE L.J. 2016, 2034-35 (2018). 
18 See Scott Hemphill & Marcel Kahan, The Strategies of Common Ownership, 129 YALE L.J. 1392 
(2020). 
19 See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Opinion, Companies Shouldn’t Be Accountable Only to Shareholders, WALL 
ST. J. (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/companies-shouldnt-be-accountable-only-to-
shareholders-1534287687; Robert J. Rhee, A Legal Theory of Shareholder Primacy, 102 MINN. L. REV. 122 
(2018); Cathy Hwang & Yaron Nili, Shareholder-Driven Stakeholderism, 2020 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 1 
(2020). 
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Second, our enterprise underscores the seemingly banal observation that data 
availability matters. A lot. Another likely reason for poor data quality in this area is that 
corporate governance documents are surprisingly difficult to collect, organize, and 
analyze. Many notable jurisdictions (such as Delaware) actively throttle public access 
to their rich documentary trove, tossing in exorbitant access fees for good measure. 
Federal regulators (such as the SEC) provide several governance documents for free, 
but only in highly disorganized form. And, the few private enterprises that have 
attempted to organize them also protect their creations aggressively with paywalls, user 
restrictions, and ominous litigation threats.20 Although the CCG partially unshackles 
the next generation of corporate governance scholars from these restraints, we 
nonetheless join with others (in law and elsewhere) in calling for better and less 
restrictive public access to public documents.21  
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. Part I assesses the most 
important empirical corporate governance studies to date, and the role of the most 
critical datasets within them. We also observe that because of the prohibitive 
challenges in obtaining underlying textual data, most researchers have relied on 
commercial third-party sources. Part II describes our research design and data 
collection protocols, providing a descriptive snapshot of the size, reach, and scope of 
the CCG. We then demonstrate that corporate charters are highly dynamic documents, 
amended with increasing frequency.22 Yet they have also progressively become more 
“lawyered,” growing longer, more technical, and less readable than their forebears of 
a quarter century ago. More provocatively, this Part uses the CCG to document the 
alarming inaccuracy of prominent corporate governance indices, showing that even 
one of best-known results in the field attenuates considerably in the presence of 
cleaned data. Part III explores important future uses of the CCG, including its ability 
to generate novel insights about the state and evolution of corporate charters. Among 
 
20 See Alaina Lancaster, ROSS Intelligence Accuses Thomson Reuters of Crushing Competitors With ‘Sham 
Copyrights and Intimidation Tactics’, THE RECORDER (Jan. 25, 2021), 
https://www.law.com/therecorder/2021/01/25/ross-intelligence-accuses-thomson-reuters-of-
crushing-competitors-with-sham-copyrights-and-intimidation-tactics/. 
21 See Julie Sobowale, The Battle to Free Legal Information, NATIONAL MAGAZINE (Feb. 4, 2021), 
https://www.nationalmagazine.ca/en-ca/articles/legal-market/legal-tech/2021/the-battle-for-legal-
information; Adam R. Pah, David L. Schwartz, Sarath Sanga, Zachary D. Clopton, Peter Dicola, Rachel 
Davis Mersey, Charlotte S. Alexander, Kristian J. Hammond & Luís A. Nunes Amaral, How to Build a 
More Open Justice Science System, 369 SCIENCE 134 (2020) (chronicling restrictions of the PACER system 
over federal judicial records). Use of our corpus is free to all, governed by a Creative Commons license. 
See infra note 189. 
22 This contrasts with the usual perception that certificates of incorporation are relatively slow to 
change. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 
(2005); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on 
Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820 (1989); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The 
Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989). But see Geeyoung Min, Shareholder Voice in Corporate 
Charter Amendments, 43 J. CORP. L. 289 (2018) (documenting an uptick in amendment frequency for the 
top 200 companies in U.S. markets after 2005). 
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other things, we illustrate how the database lends itself to a wide variety of emergent 
computational and machine learning techniques, spotlighting several applications. Part 
IV discusses the broader implications of our study, situating it within the larger 
enterprise of empirical legal studies. A final section concludes.23 
I. The State of Play in Empirical Corporate Governance Research 
This article puts forward, for the first time, a clean, open-source, researchable 
corpus of corporate charters—the documentary DNA of corporate governance. But 
before proceeding to describe the CCG database itself, it is important to underscore 
why this data resource is so important. While there are many moving parts, two forces 
predominate: supply and demand. We discuss each below, followed by a discussion of 
the practical constraints that face researchers who endeavor to collect raw corporate 
governance documents. 
A. Demand  
The field of law and finance is, in relative terms, extremely young. Until about 25 
years ago, finance and business law researchers typically sailed on scholarly ships that 
passed in the night: Financial economists gravitated toward theoretical models and 
data-driven explorations, while legal scholars immersed themselves in institutional 
detail, exploring rich contextual structures that seemingly defied quantification. 
Change began to take hold, however, with a series of seminal articles in the mid-
1990s. A collection of prominent finance scholars set about exploring how legal 
institutions affect profit generation, market value, and other relevant corporate 
outcomes. At the vanguard of the effort were several provocative papers by La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny (LLSV).24 LLSV explored how formal country-
level shareholder protections are correlated to and/or predict several important 
measures of company and shareholder value. To quantify their analysis, LLSV 
canvassed inter-jurisdictional protections to formulate an “antidirector rights index”—
a country-level proxy for shareholder rights. Their index led to several provocative 
findings, including that countries with stronger investor protections are more likely to 
 
23 Several appendices (both attached and online at www.publiccompanycharters.com) provide 
additional details about our study design, results, robustness checks, and access to the corpus itself. 
24 See La Porta et al., supra note 6; Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & 
Robert Vishny, Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997); Rafael La Porta, Florencio 
Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999); 
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. W7403, 1999), http:// papers.ssrn.com/paper. 
taf?abstract_id=227583; Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Agency Problems 
and Dividend Policies Around the World, 55 J. FIN. 1 (2000). 
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have common-law legal origins,25 more advanced capital markets,26 more ownership 
dispersion,27 higher firm valuations,28 and less earnings manipulation.29 
LLSV’s collective contributions were an instant classic, and for good reason: They 
demonstrated concretely how law “mattered” for nearly all aspects of finance, ranging 
from firm value, to ownership composition, to market risk. Tens of thousands of 
articles have cited LLSV, in both widely-respected law and finance/economics 
journals.30 Using the index, LLSV and hundreds of others generated a laundry list of 
provocative and influential findings.31 And legions of other articles to date have 
incorporated LLSV’s index or its underlying data as inputs32 to establish connections 
between shareholder protection and the size of capital markets,33 ownership 
dispersion,34 firm valuation,35 and earnings management.36 
As influential as LLSV’s contributions were,37 it soon became evident that their 
approach was just the tip of a much larger corporate governance iceberg. As lawyers 
know all too well, much of contemporary business law consists of a set of background 
rules that can give way if firms take steps to modify their application or opt out 
completely.38 Setting the jurisdiction as the unit of analysis inevitably misses (or 
mushes) this firm-level heterogeneity.  
That lacuna was soon to be filled by another watershed contribution, this time 
courtesy of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (GIM).39 GIM introduced a then-novel third-
party dataset created by the Investor Responsibility Resource Center (IRRC), which 
 
25 La Porta et al., supra note 6, at 1. 
26 Spamann, supra note 10, at 468. 
27 Id.  
28 Id.  
29 Id.  
30 According to JSTOR, LLSV’s article was referenced 23,266 times, including in some of the 
highest-profile journals, such as the Quarterly Journal of Economics, Journal of Financial Economics, and the 
Review of Financial Studies. 
31 See supra note 24. 
32 See Spamann, supra note 10. For instance, Licht et al. used it to analyze the relationship between 
culture and the level of minority shareholders’ and creditors’ protection, finding that national cultural 
priorities consistent with public acceptance of litigation correlated with indices of creditor and 
shareholder voting rights. See Amir N. Licht et al., supra note 10. Reese and Weisbach also used the 
index, finding that companies in legal systems with less shareholder protection were more likely to 
cross-list in the United States. See Reese & Weisbach, supra note 10. 
33 Spamann, supra note 10, at 480.  
34 Id. at 468. 
35 Id.  
36 Id.  
37 We note that LLSV’s contributions, like much of empirical corporate finance, could only suggest 
causal connections, but did not have an “identification strategy” to test such claims. 
38 Gillian Hadfield & Eric Talley, On Public Versus Private Provision of Corporate Law, 22 J.L. ECON. 
& ORG. 414, 418 (2006).  
39 Gompers et al., supra note 6. 
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purported to quantify shareholder protections at the individual firm level, accounting 
for both jurisdiction-level differences and firms’ private ordering decisions. Their data 
tracked a cross section of large U.S.-traded issuers over several years. Consequently, 
the governance data that GIM marshaled included much of the granularity and panel 
structure that LLSV lacked, facilitating a far richer analysis of the interaction between 
governance and outcomes. 
Not to be out-Mamboed in the governance index dance-off, GIM proposed an 
index of their own—the “G-Index”—which represented the sum of 24 binary 
variables from their dataset related to shareholder protections, antitakeover measures, 
and governance rights. They offered the G-Index as a rough proxy for good governance: 
Lower G-Index scores corresponded to more “democratic” or shareholder-friendly 
firms, while higher scores corresponded to “dictatorial” or management-friendly firms. 
And when the authors projected these scores onto several financial performance 
metrics, their findings were noteworthy: They showed that companies with relatively 
democratic governance profiles outperformed their more dictatorial counterparts 
along multiple dimensions, including firm value, profitability, and growth.40 But one 
result in particular stood out: that good governance was also a financial arbitrage 
opportunity.41 GIM estimated that a “long-short” investment strategy of (a) buying 
companies with the most democratic profiles, and (b) selling short the most dictatorial 
ones delivered a risk-adjusted return that outperformed the market by an eye-popping 9% 
per year, a wedge that confounded explanation by accepted theories in finance.42  
If LLSV was an instant classic, then GIM was a mic drop. Notwithstanding its 
more recent vintage, GIM has been cited by more than 9,000 academic articles,43 and 
it is the seventy-third most downloaded paper of all time on the Social Science 
Research Network.44 Scores of follow-on papers have either employed the G-index 
directly, have attempted to build upon it, or have attempted to test it in other settings.  
The decades since GIM’s contribution, in fact, have spawned an alphabet soup of 
governance indices, all derived directly from the same foundational data used to 
construct the G-Index. These include the “E-index” (a subset of the G-index 
 
40 Gompers et al., supra note 6, at 121-29; Bernard Black, Antonio Gldeson de Carvalho, 
Vikramaditya Khanna, Woochan Kim & Burcin Yurtoglu, Corporate Governance Indices and Construct 
Validity, 25 CORP. GOVERNANCE 1 (2017). 
41 Gompers et al., supra note 6, at 139-42. 
42 Id.  
43 The Social Science Research Network indicated that Gompers’s article was cited 9,485 times. 
Articles citing Gompers have appeared in multiple volumes of some of the most cited journals, such as 
the Quarterly Journal of Economics, the Journal of Finance, the Journal of Financial Economics, and the Review of 
Financial Studies. 
44 Paul A. Gompers, Joy L. Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, SOC. SCI. 
RSCH. NETWORK, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=278920 (last visited Feb. 1, 
2021). 
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measuring management entrenchment),45 the “O-index” (a subset of the G-index that 
does not include the E-index),46 and the “D-index” (the Deterrence index, measuring 
takeover defense),47 among others.48 Others have used the G-Index (and/or its 
variations) as a jumping-off point for new empirical corporate governance research. 
One study, for example, relied on the same data to argue that firms with weaker 
governance structures have smaller cash reserves.49 Another contribution used the G-
index to test whether weak governance causes diminished stock returns.50 And yet 
another used the G-Index as a proxy for the strength of a firm’s other governance 
mechanisms to show the significant impact that female directors had on a board’s 
inputs and firm’s outcomes.51 Several critics have also emerged, too, questioning the 
generality and longevity of the G-Index’s relationship to outcomes, and observing that 
such effects appear to change materially in the periods after the publication of GIM’s 
study.52  
While these various follow-on contributions differ in many respects, they have 
one thing in common: They all place abiding faith in the integrity of the data that 
impelled GIM. And they have done so—across disparate areas of law, finance, 
accounting and economics—with considerable zeal.53 Even those who have come out 
 
45 Melih Madanoglu & Ersem Karadag, Corporate Governance Provisions and Firm Financial Performance, 
28 INT’L J. CONTEMP. HOSP. MGMT. 1805, 1806 (2015). 
46 Bebchuk et al., What Matters, supra note 11. 
47 Karpoff et al., supra note 11.  
48 See generally Straska & Waller, supra note 10, at 933. 
49 Jarrad Harford, Sattar Mansi & William F. Maxwell, Corporate Governance and Firm Cash Holdings 
in the US, 87 J. FIN. ECON. 535, 541 (2008), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi= 
10.1.1.708.533&rep=rep 1&type=pdf.  
50 Core et al., supra note 11. 
51 See Renée B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, Women in the Boardroom and Their Impact on Governance and 
Performance, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 291 (2009). 
52 See, e.g., Klausner, supra note 11; Robert M. Daines, Ian D. Gow & David F. Larcker, Rating the 
Ratings: How Good Are Commercial Governance Ratings?, 98 J. FIN. ECON. 439 (2010); Bebchuk et al., 
Disappearing Association, supra note 11. 
53 See Bebchuk et al., What Matters, supra note 11, at 784 (calling Gompers et al. paper “influential”); 
Genc Alimehmeti & Angelo Paletta, Corporate Governance Indexes: The Confounding Effects of Using Different 
Measures, 4 J. APPLIED ECON & BUS. RSCH. 64, 65 (describing Gompers et al.’s paper as a “landmark” 
paper); Beth Ahlering & Simon Deakin, Labour Regulation, Corporate Governance and Legal Origin: A Case of 
Institutional Complementarity? (U. of Cambridge Centre for Bus. Rsch., Working Paper No. 312, 2005) 
(noting that La Porta et al.’s research has “inform[ed] the policy and working methods of the World 
Bank and other international financial institutions”); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: 
The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1 (2001) (referring to 
La Porta et al.’s law-and-finance scholarship as “seminal”); Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in Corporate 
Law Between the United States and Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 697, 699 
(2005) (same); Nicholas Thompson, Common Denominator, LEGAL AFF. (2005) (describing La Porta et 
al.’s impact as influential). 
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as critical of the governance-index enterprise have based their arguments largely on 
the indices’ predictive qualities, presuming the accuracy of the underlying indices.54 
The demand for data-driven corporate governance insights, moreover, transcends 
academia. It also extends to professional governance advocates, Wall Street investors, 
and even government regulators. The U.S Securities and Exchange Commission, for 
example, routinely uses the empirical corporate governance literature—including 
LLSV and GIM—in rulemaking. A recent proposal to amend federal proxy rules, for 
example, cites both studies, interpreting them to demonstrate that “[s]trong 
shareholder rights have been associated with higher firm valuations and better 
developed equity markets.”55 The SEC has cited empirical literature in a proposed rule 
on investment advisors and broker-dealers,56 in a report on M&A disclosure 
requirements,57 and in a proposed rule on accelerated filers.58 Earlier this year, the SEC 
cited LLSV again in a final rule on good faith determinations of fair value.59 
Clearly, empirical corporate governance research, and the abecedarian conga line 
of indices it spawned, have become a centerpiece of both academic discourse and 
regulatory decision making. That attention, in turn, has increased the demand for more 
resources (quantitative data in particular) that could power additional insights to help 
adjudicate policy debates. But a demand for empirical corporate governance resources 
would remain unrequited without a corresponding supply. As we detail in the next 
subsection, that supply chain has proven to be limited, expensive, and undependable.  
B. Supply  
The seemingly insatiable demand for quantitative corporate governance resources 
has always faced serious supply shortages. Indeed, as provocative as the findings of 
LLSV, GIM and their progeny were, perhaps their most enduring contributions were 
the new data they brought to the table, quantifying governance for the first time. 
But the sheer novelty of these efforts was also their Achilles’ heel. Turning 
nebulous bodies of prolix corporate governance texts into concrete, measurable, 
usable data requires an unusual mélange of quantitative skill, economic intuition, 
 
54 See, e.g., Daines et al., supra note 52; Bebchuk et al., Disappearing Association, supra note 11. 
55 Universal Proxy, 81 Fed. Reg. 79,122 (Nov. 10, 2016) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).  
56 Form CRS Relationship Summary; Amendments to Form ADV; Required Disclosures in Retail 
Communications and Restrictions on the Use of Certain Names or Titles, 83 Fed. Reg. 21,416, 21,442 
nn.233–38, 21,485 nn.575–76 (proposed May 9, 2018) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, 275, 
279).  
57 Amendments to Financial Disclosures About Acquired and Disposed Businesses, Release No. 
33-10786, 2020 WL 5096804, at 54043 n.442 (Aug. 31, 2020). 
58 Form CRS Relationship Summary; Amendments to Form ADV; Required Disclosures in Retail 
Communications and Restrictions on the Use of Certain Names or Titles, Release No. 34-83063, 2018 
WL 2114080, at 21442 nn.233-238 (May 19, 2018). 
59 Good Faith Determinations of Fair Value, 86 Fed. Reg. 748, 795 (Jan. 6, 2021) (to be codified 
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 270).  
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and—most importantly—lawyerly chops. Corporate governance regimes are typically 
conjured from a dense thicket of documents, statutes, legislative histories, case law, 
and a superstructure of interpretive canons. Parsing these inputs into usable data is all 
but impossible without legal training. Even today, very few possess the requisite skills 
to peel back the layers of this institutional onion. This skill set was rarer still a quarter-
century ago.  
The difficulties of “coding law” were immediately apparent even in the early 
studies that analyzed jurisdictional corporate governance regimes. These studies, 
starting with LLSV’s pioneering work, had to quantify country-level legal protections. 
To go about doing so, the authors needed to assess—across over four dozen national 
jurisdictions—six mechanisms for investor protection.60 Having little or no legal 
training themselves, the authors eventually farmed out the work, surveying local 
lawyers in each jurisdiction to identify whether it had the various enumerated investor 
protections of interest.  
The resulting methodology was innovative for its time, but it was also frustratingly 
opaque. There is scant information about how the authors identified their respondents 
or the respondents’ expertise. There is also no information on how the authors dealt 
with inter-respondent inconsistencies. As others soon noticed, these types of 
inconsistencies proved commonplace. 
No one seriously endeavored to interrogate the underlying anti-directors rights 
index itself until 2010, when Holger Spamann began kicking its tires in a replication 
study. Spamann used a more systematic approach to recruit and orient foreign-trained 
lawyers to recode the majority of LLSV’s primary jurisdictional data, taking significant 
care to ensure inter-coder reliability. When the dust settled, he found that many of the 
features contained within the original index were incorrect, and—more importantly—
that certain of the most provocative results could not be replicated once the data were 
corrected.61  
Spamann’s findings were careful, systematic, and ultimately devastating. More 
generally, his analysis exposed a larger problem that continues to vex empirical 
corporate governance: The challenge of quantifying jurisdictional legal factors that are 
themselves somewhat nuanced, the ambiguity that occurs when a statutory mandate is 
overridden by firms that opt out of it, and the deployment of personnel who had not 
been trained to assess these factors consistently. Challenges like these suffused LLSV’s 
data, and Spamann surmises that the ensuing reliability issues may have been the 
 
60 They were shareholder voting by mail, voting without blocking of shares, the limits on 
shareholders’ ability to call a special meeting, whether minority shareholders had proportional board 
representation or cumulative voting, whether existing shareholders had a preemptive right to buy new 
issuances of stock, and the kinds of judicial remedies available to shareholders. Gompers et al., supra 
note 6, at 114-15.  
61 Spamann, supra note 10, at 469.  
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byproduct of differences in corporate practice62 and the fact that LLSV’s original 
survey respondents were unclear about whether their remit was to answer questions 
about formal legal mandates, prevailing private-ordering norms, or their own personal 
experiences.63  
By the time Spamann’s deconstruction of LLSV hit the presses, many of the cool 
kids of corporate governance were already chasing the next rainbow: firm-level 
governance. Zeroing in on a more granular unit of analysis constitutes a considerable 
improvement (for the reasons detailed above); yet at the same time, the firm-level 
approach seems susceptible to many of the same vulnerabilities that plagued LLSV. 
Maybe even worse: Coding law consistently at the jurisdiction level is hard enough; 
layering on firm-level governance can complicate matters considerably. Not only must 
one correctly interpret when and how companies have attempted to tailor their internal 
governance affairs, but one must do so against the backdrop of statutory and 
jurisdictional rules. 
Figure 1 conceptualizes some of these difficulties using a planetary metaphor for 
corporate governance choices. A statute/regulation (represented by the black hole at 
the system’s center) represents a fixed background rule on corporate governance that 
applies to companies incorporated in the jurisdiction. Should an entity (represented by 
the various planets) wish to replace that rule and with its own self-styled regime, it is 
as though it needs to break the gravitational pull of the statutory mandate.  
For certain governance mandates, opting out is impossible, as depicted by the 
inner red planet. Here, the statutory rule is immutable, with a gravitational pull so strong 
as to trap all objects within its event horizon. If a company within this zone wished to 
embrace a different regime, its efforts would be null and void.64 In other situations 
(represented by the successively more distant planets), the gravitational pull of the 
mandate is weaker. Here, the statute specifies a default rule,65 theoretically permitting 
firms to embrace self-styled regimes through private ordering. But here too, differing 
requirements may apply if a firm is to achieve the needed escape velocity to break 
 
62 Id. at 473.  
63 As Spamann notes in his 2010 review of La Porta et al., supra note 6, practitioners inconsistently 
interpreted La Porta et al.’s questions. For example, neither Finland nor the United States defaults to 
cumulative voting, but La Porta et al. coded Finland as zero and the United States as one. See id. at 472.  
64 Pennsylvania’s famous constituency statute, for example, does not allow companies to waive or 
avoid the statutory mandate that the board must account for multiple stakeholders’ interests. See 15 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1715(b); see also Robert Goodyear Murray, Money Talks, Constituents Walk: 
Pennsylvania’s Corporate Constituency Statute Can Maximize Shareholders’ Wealth, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 629, 643 
(2000) (opining that the constituency statute “is a specific grant of discretion to directors to determine 
which constituency group’s interests to elevate above others, ranking shareholders as only one of the 
interests and not giving them a priority interest”). Similarly, Delaware corporations can extend bylaw 
amendment power to directors only if done through a provision in the articles of incorporation. See 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109. 
65 See generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of 
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). 
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away: The most tenacious types of default rules (conceptualized through the orange 
planet) require nothing less than a charter provision to opt out.66 Other default 
mandates are less sticky, giving way as well to contraventions in “lower level” 
corporate documents—such as a shareholder-enacted bylaw (yellow planet), an 
ordinary bylaw (purple),67 or a simple board resolution (green).68 
Figure 1: Statutory Mandates and Achieving Opt-Out Escape Velocity 
 
Even when a state law provision permits opt-outs, and even if the corporation 
takes the requisite steps to achieve escape velocity, another layer of complexity awaits: 
the corporation may still not be free to explore all parsecs of the corporate governance 
universe: state law often deems certain types of self-styled regimes to be off limits.69  
The upshot of this discussion is that for many dimensions of corporate governance, 
the regime that ultimately applies to the firm requires understanding (a) what the state’s 
substantive background mandate is; (b) whether that mandate permits opting out; (c) 
what the lowest level document is for executing an opt out; (d) what the constrained 
 
66 Delaware’s staggered board statute, for example, requires that any board stagger be effectuated 
through the charter, initial bylaw, or a shareholder-promulgated bylaw. See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 141(d) (2010). 
67 In this category, and in the remaining ones, the stated means for opting out is sufficient, but any 
“higher level” document can generally accomplish the task too. Consequently, because charters are at 
the top of the corporate governance pecking order, a charter provision would also be sufficient to opt 
out of a state mandate that allows opt-outs through a “lower level” document, such as a shareholder 
approved bylaw.  
68 For example, Delaware permits corporations the option to provide for proxy expense 
reimbursement to activists through ordinary bylaw provisions. See  DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 113. 
69 For instance, while Delaware permits firms to include a forum selection provision in its bylaws, 
it prohibits a corporation to exclude Delaware courts from hearing “internal corporate claims.” DEL. 
CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 115. And Maryland gives shareholders a default right to convene a special meeting 
with the support of 25% votable shares. Corporations are allowed through their bylaws to increase that 
threshold, but they are not allowed to increase it beyond 50%. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-
502. 
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choices are for the opting-out entity; and (e) whether the corporation has succeeded 
in opting out in a manner that complies with (a) through (d). In short, it is logical, but 
it’s also complicated. 
So how does the firm-level data GIM relied on fare in this more complicated 
environment? Unfortunately, we simply do not know at first blush. Even as compared 
to LLSV’s index, the IRRC data used by GIM are surprisingly opaque and poorly 
documented. Little remains (if it ever existed) about what went into it. In fact, the 
dataset appears to have had no detailed manual, but it instead refers interlocutors to 
the appendix of the GIM paper,70 a curious move since that appendix only cursorily 
describes the variable definitions, with little mention of data gathering and quality-
control measures.71 And, as detailed above, there does not appear to have been any 
researcher with the time, resources, and risk tolerances to interrogate the firm-level 
IRRC data used by GIM.72 
Consequently, today’s researchers have scant information about how the IRRC 
constructed their labels.73 We know little about what documents they consulted—state 
law, charters, bylaws, or something else entirely. There is no information about how 
coders resolved inconsistencies between the documents, if they considered multiple 
documents at all. There is no indication about the credentials of the coders themselves, 
or measures to ensure inter-coder consistency. And there is only a small amount of 
information about the nuances of state laws. For example, when the coders noted that 
a state law existed on a particular topic, did they assess whether the state law immutably 
required something of corporations? Or was the state law a default that allowed 
corporations to opt out? Or was the state law silent, and allowed corporations to opt-
in?  
The IRRC data’s issues are compounded further by a rotisserie of corporate 
ownership changes: In 2005, IRRC was acquired by ISS.74 And two years later, 
RiskMetrics acquired ISS, changing data gathering protocols and retiring the IRRC 
 
70 See Overview of IRRC Governance Database in WRDS, available at https://wrds-
www.wharton.upenn.edu/documents/718/Overview_of_IRRC_Legacy_Governance_Definitions.pd
f. Our review of the IRRC Corporate Takeover Defenses data did not reveal a methodology section. 
71 Gompers et al., supra note 6, at 145-50.  
72 The original companion manuals to the data set are surprisingly hard to find. We searched in 
every law library in the United States and mobilized the combined forces our respective institutional 
librarians—including contacts at law firms. After weeks of searching, we managed to a few examples, 
whose methodology descriptions were frustratingly opaque. See note 73, infra. 
73 Although an annual IRRC publication described the various label categories, it does not touch 
on the methodology of data collection or the training/expertise of labelers themselves. See, e.g., Virginia 
K, Rosenbaum, CORPORATE TAKEOVER DEFENSES ix (1998) (devoting all of three short sentences to 
data collection protocols). 
74 Robert Kropp, SRI Field Continues to Shift with RiskMetrics’ Acquisition of KLD, GREENBIZ (Nov. 
6, 2009), https://www.greenbiz.com/article/sri-field-continues-shift-riskmetrics-acquisition-kld 
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data into “Legacy” status.75 The contemporary ISS dataset has improved 
documentation, but it is still slim, and in any event it covers only a loosely overlapping 
set of variables with IRRC’s, excluding critical ingredients in the G-Index. As a result, 
it is now impossible to extend G-index data computations beyond 2006.76 For those 
interested in slicing and dicing the G-Index, then, they must largely do so inside a time 
capsule from the 1990s and early 2000s. 
Nevertheless, the robust demand for governance studies has induced legions of 
contemporary scholars to return to the original wellspring of the IRRC (and the 
associated G-index) to study governance, assuming those data to be accurate and 
hoping to say something generalizable to contemporary settings. Top finance journals 
continue to publish research that is based on those early data.77 One notable 
contribution78 even extended the IRRC data and G-Index going backwards in time 
(from 1978-1989) using a subsample of companies, but in doing so it also largely 
presumed the integrity of the IRRC database itself. And while the moving tectonic 
plates of empirical corporate governance literature are increasingly surfacing concerns 
regarding methodological designs,79 data integrity80 and empirical design,81 the IRRC 
and the G-Index have largely remained uninterrogated.   
Although there are a few alternatives to the IRRC index, those that exist are 
problematic too. The contemporary ISS dataset82 offers a variety of governance 
metrics, but it does not offer enough of them to replicate well-known indices, and its 
protocols appear somewhat different from IRRCs even for the same variables it traces. 
It too, has relatively poor documentation, and seems potentially vulnerable to similar 
 




77 See, e.g., Karpoff et al., supra note 11 (employing an instrumental variables strategy on the G-
Index in an attempt to tease out causal inference). When a variable being instrumented for is subject to 
measurement error, however, it can generate spurious results). See Dan A. Black, Mark C. Berger & 
Frank A. Scott, Bounding Parameter Estimates with Nonclassical Measurement Error, 95 J. AM. STAT. ASSOC. 
739 (2000). 
78 See Cremers & Ferrell, supra note 10. We discuss this important paper in the context of our 
project at greater length infra note 107. 
79 See Yair Listokin, Interpreting Empirical Estimates of the Effect of Corporate Governance, AMERICAN 
LAW AND ECONOMICS REVIEW 90 (2008) 
80 See Emiliano M. Catan, The Insignificance of Clear-Day Poison Pills, 48 JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
(2019); Emiliano M. Catan & Marcel Kahan, The Law and Finance of  Antitakeover Statutes, 68 
Stanford. L. Rev. 629 (2016). 
81 See Robert Bartlett & Frank Partnoy, The Misuse of Tobin’s q,  73 Vand. L. Rev. 353 (2020). 
82 See ISS, supra note 75. 
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coding errors.83 Another popular data provider, Factset,84 tracks even fewer 
governance metrics than ISS, and it is difficult to obtain data for historical years. And 
another, Compact Disclosure, is poorly organized for this particular task, and it ceased 
all updates in 2006. 
Without cataloguing the remaining (modest) list of other governance datasets, 
none of them can be easily quality checked without access to the underlying documents 
from which they are purportedly built. And yet, none of these sources (that we are 
aware of) allows users to access the texts on which their data labels are based. To audit 
accuracy, then, one must recover these documents independently, read them for legal 
import, and confirm whether the assigned label was correct.  
And this is where the challenge really begins. For even if one possessed the skills 
(and resources, and patience) to weed through mountains of raw governance 
documents for substantive content, simply gaining access to an organized corpus of 
them is surprisingly hard. In theory, of course, lots of corporate governance documents 
are in the public domain, and state and federal governments have the means to provide 
organized access to them. Moreover, statutes and case law are but a quick internet 
search away. Harvesting this information should not be all that difficult, should it? 
Yet, irritatingly, it is. This article focuses on what would seem to be the easiest of 
targets—articles of incorporation (also known as charters), a corporation’s first and 
most important corporate governance document.85 The charter is critical, for it is both 
a corporation’s birth certificate and its constitution: To form a corporation in any U.S. 
jurisdiction, an incorporator must first file a charter (including within it a host of 
necessary ingredients) with a state secretary of state, who in turn maintains repositories 
of such documents.86 And for publicly traded companies, charters also must be filed 
with the SEC.87 In theory, then, public company charters should be readily available 
from both state and federal sources.88 In practice, however, extracting the text of 
contemporary charters on a wide-scale basis is tricky, expensive, and time-consuming.  
 
83 In Online Appendix C, we show that the contemporary ISS governance data also appear to be 
hampered by significant errors as judged by our newly compiled data (though not as severe as IRRC’s).  
84 See Data Solutions, FACTSET, https://www.factset.com/solutions/business-needs/data-solutions 
(last visited Feb. 10, 2021). 
85 Although corporations often have numerous governance documents, the most important one 
is the charter. In addition to charters and bylaws, corporations generally have additional governance 
documents, such as committee charters, corporate governance guidelines, and a variety of other 
documents that corporations adopt to meet stock exchange, regulatory, and other requirements. See 
Sarah C. Haan, Shareholder Proposal Settlements and the Private Ordering of Public Elections, 126 YALE L.J. 262 
(2016) (showing that many corporate disclosures about campaign finance are made as the result of 
negotiated private settlements with shareholders); Yaron Nili & Cathy Hwang, Shadow Governance, 108 
CALIF. L. REV. 1097, 1107-09 (2020). 
86 What are Articles of Incorporation?, HARBOR COMPLIANCE, https://www.harborcompliance.
com/information/what-are-articles-of-incorporation (last visited Feb. 5, 2021).  
87 17 C.F.R. § 229.601(b)(3) (2021). 
88 15 U.S.C. § 78(m). 
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Consider what might be the most obvious strategy: approach relevant state 
governments to gain access to their primary documents. Good luck: Delaware, where 
the majority of public companies are incorporated,89 makes it risibly difficult to obtain 
corporate charters in native form. By way of example, consider the task of assembling 
the chartering history of Google’s parent company, Alphabet Inc. Although it is a 
Delaware-incorporated entity, searching on the Delaware Secretary of State’s website 
yielded no results: the entity search function returns only the first 50 hits matching 
“Alphabet,” and Alphabet Inc. was not among them. But even if Alphabet Inc. had 
been among the first 50, obtaining information about whether the entity is active 
requires one to pay a $10 fee. To obtain an inventory of all documents filed in the state 
by that entity would cost an additional $175 for each registrant.90  
All this, of course, still falls short of producing the raw texts themselves. For that, 
one would additionally have to make a formal document request for each individual 
entity with the Delaware Department of State, incurring a per-document fee of $10 
for the first page plus $2 for each additional page.91 After some period of days or 
weeks, a hard copy packet would arrive in the mail, whereupon the researcher would 
need to use character recognition technology to scan and digitize its contents.92 The 
costs quickly add up: There are 1,713 Delaware-incorporated issuers in our corpus, 
comprising about 60% of the total number we track across all U.S. states. Delaware 
entities have a mean chartering history of 3.3 documents per issuer, and an average 
length of 12.4 pages per document.93 All told, if one wholly disregards labor costs, and 
 
89 About the Division of Corporations, DEL. DIV. OF CORPS., https://corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency/ 
(last visited Jan. 27, 2021) (noting that more than 66% of the Fortune 500 are incorporated in Delaware).  
90 See Accessing Corporate Information, DEL. DIV. OF CORPS., https://corp.delaware.gov/directweb/ 
(last visited Jan. 27, 2021) (describing the process of requesting documents). While on first blush there 
appears to be a cheaper $20 option to access a list of filed documents, that list only shows the last five 
documents filed. (To discover this informational nugget, a research assistant spent 20 minutes on the 
phone with the Delaware Secretary of State’s office. 
91 For the current fee schedule, see Delaware Department of State, Division of Corporations Fee 
Schedule (2020), https://corpfiles.delaware.gov/Augustfee2020.pdf. Although Delaware evidently 
maintains the entire collection in digital form, the cumbersome process described in the text appears 
non-negotiable, even for pure researchers. Early in this project, and armed with the written endorsement 
of Hon. Leo Strine (the then-sitting Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court), we approached 
Delaware’s Deputy Secretary of State and Director of Division of Corporations requesting access to the 
state’s corpus (on a confidential basis). Our attempt was quickly rebuffed. See E-mail from Deputy 
Secretary Kristopher Knight to Eric Talley (Aug. 31, 2017) (on file with authors) (“I appreciate the 
offer, but the Division has a long-standing practice of not participating in such arrangements”). 
92 Alternatively, one could take a quick sojourn to Dover, Delaware—about an hour’s drive south 
of Interstate 95, and coincidentally abutting the scenic Bombay Hook National Wildlife Refuge—where 
one could then enjoy the privilege of queuing up for one of the state-issue public terminals to access 
and print documents (for one hour at a time as we understand, if other users are waiting). Id. 
93 This figure is based on a mean word count of 4,571 at an average of 368 words per page. See 
infra Part II for a more fulsome analysis of these measures. 
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further assumes no expediting costs ($1,000 per document for same-day service94), we 
estimate that the Delaware Department of State would charge no less than $485,190,95 
simply to replicate three-fifths of the textual corpus we unveil (free of charge) in this 
article.96  
Similar attempts to obtain primary documents from New York, California, 
Nevada, and Massachusetts fared little better: In each state, we grappled with decades-
old computer systems, spent hours on the phone, and were offered seemingly random 
collections of charter documents to be dribbled out over the course of days or weeks, 
usually for hundreds of dollars. In any realistic sense, then, seeking out governance 
documents from state repositories is a non-starter. 
Those interested in publicly traded companies have two other possible avenues. 
First, many companies’ investor relations websites contain charters. Their digital 
format is far from uniform, however, and they typically contain only current (but not 
historical) versions, frustrating researchers who wish to study governance both cross-
sectionally and over time. Consequently, such sources have limited value. 
The other option (and the one we ultimately pursued here) is to go to the SEC, 
which maintains a repository of current and historical filings that users can access for 
free—depending on how one defines free. To be sure, public companies are required 
to file up-to-date charters with the SEC, and the Commission duly records all public 
filings from the last twenty-five years or so on its online EDGAR database.97 That 
said, EDGAR proves to be a cumbersome hunting ground for governance documents. 
The interface is notoriously hard to filter and search,98 and locating charters is 
particularly challenging. Although components of EDGAR filings have become 
predictable and regularized over the years, corporate charters and bylaws have not, and 
their disclosed content is often squirreled away in odd and irregular places.99 And, 
 
94 see Delaware Department of State, Division of Corporations Fee Schedule (2020), 
https://corpfiles.delaware.gov/Augustfee2020.pdf. 
95 This figure ignores the $10 fee to gauge whether the firm is active, but includes the Long Form 
certificate of filings, resulting in total a cost computed by: [$175 + $10(3.3)+$2(3.3)(12.7-1)]×1713. 
96 We were unable to determine how much revenue the Delaware Secretary of State’s office 
generates in charging for access to these ostensibly public documents. Consequently, we cannot estimate 
how our efforts to make a sizable corpus of them freely available to the public may cut into these 
revenue margins.  
97 15 U.S.C. § 78(m). 
98 Several practitioners have even authored how-to articles on EDGAR use. See, e.g., Duff 
McDonald, Unscrambling Edgar: The SEC’s Database Is Torture to Use but Help Is Out There, 28 MONEY 175 
(1999). 
99 In theory, issuers are supposed to tag their charters as “Exhibit 3” in the context of periodic 
filings (10-K, 10-Q) and current reports (8-K). But in practice, these tags are applied with varying 
degrees of consistency. For example, Biglari Holdings Inc.’s 2018 S-4 registration statement contains 
the text of its charter in a section labeled “Annex II,” while Parkway Property Inc.’s 1996 charter is in 
“Exhibit B” to the companies’ preliminary proxy statement. These tagging inconsistencies appear also 
to frustrate the search algorithms of commercial services. See also John Gerdes Jr., EDGAR-Analyzer: 
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because EDGAR only has filings from the mid-1990s, locating pre-1990s materials 
requires submitting a records request to the SEC—an exercise that, reminiscent of 
state regulators, requires Byzantine paperwork,100 a 20-day processing period, and an 
hourly processing fee for the lucky employee charged with hunting down the 
documents.101 
A related strategy for the exhausted researcher might be to leverage commercial 
search platforms, such as Westlaw, LexisNexis, and Bloomberg, which also track 
EDGAR filings but purport to offer user-friendly search conduits. Our research 
suggests that Westlaw is perhaps the most comprehensive for a project like ours, 
allowing researchers to search for “articles of incorporation/bylaws” for individual 
companies. However, Westlaw seems to compile its underlying data in a way that 
succumbs to the EDGAR filing irregularities described above.102 Consequently, 
extracting a firm’s chartering history on Westlaw frequently results in troubling gaps 
in coverage. Holding that issue aside, Westlaw’s search results often require extensive 
post-processing by researchers seeking to build a usable panel of chartering histories. 
Westlaw does provide researchers with unfiltered lists of up to 1,000 documents that 
may contain charters (interlaced with bylaws and many other texts). While potentially 
useful, these lists usually contain duplicates103 and are ordered by filing date (which can 
be years or even decades after their effective dates).  
Even if one is lucky enough to locate comprehensive chartering histories from a 
commercial provider like Westlaw, she will likely be prohibited from using them for a 
project of any scale. Users can download no more than 100 text documents at once. 
With a combination of patience, ingenuity, and web-scraping technology, one might 
be able to work around some of these technical speed bumps; but doing so would almost 
certainly violate Westlaw’s user agreement, subjecting the user to a lock on her 
account. Posting the results publicly might also trigger the litigious wrath with which 
the company enforces its user agreements.104 If one hopes to access and share the full 
 
Automating the Analysis of Corporate Data Contained in the SEC’s EDGAR Database, 35 DECISION SUPPORT 
SYS. 7, 8 (2009) (describing SGML tags and identifying challenges posed by improper tagging).  
100 See Public Documents, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/fast-
answers/answerspublicdocshtm.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2021). 
101 See Schedule of Fees for Record Services, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
https://www.sec.gov/foia/feesche.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2021). 
102 Evidently, Westlaw (like other commercial providers) focuses exclusively on EDGAR filings 
located under the “Exhibit 3” heading—the exhibit category supposedly designated for charters and 
by-laws. In practice, as noted above, many companies disregard this heading mandate, squirrelling away 
their governance documents under different exhibit numbers (or none at all). 
103 For example, Phase Forward Inc adopted a new charter in the context of its IPO in July 2004. 
Different versions of this document can be found in four different filings from around the time of the 
IPO, and all filings are represented as separate entries in Westlaw’s search results. 
104 See Terms of Use, THOMSON REUTERS, https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/legal-
notices/terms-of-use (last visited Feb. 10, 2021) (stating “you will not reproduce, duplicate, copy, 
download, store, further transmit, disseminate, transfer, or otherwise exploit this website, or any portion 
hereof without Thomson Reuters’ prior written consent”). The company has been aggressive of late in 
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textual chartering histories for thousands of public companies, then, commercial data 
providers offer little refuge.105  
II. Reclaiming Corporate Governance 
Given the paucity of existing data and the shortcomings in strategies for gathering 
the data from scratch, researchers enjoy few attractive options, and they are usually 
left to muddle through in an ad hoc way while adjusting priorities and limiting their 
research designs.  
This article endeavors to sweep away these obstacles, reclaiming the textual DNA 
of corporate governance for all researchers in the process. In this Part, we begin by 
unveiling the results of this multi-year enterprise: the CCG, which involved harvesting 
by hand thousands of corporate charters spanning the better part of three decades, 
cleaning them, labeling them, and making the resulting corpus an open-source public 
good (as it always should have been). We then spotlight several immediate payoffs of 
this effort, ranging from intriguing descriptive accounts of the corpus, to reassessing 
heretofore accepted wisdoms in law and finance, to marshaling the emergent tools of 
machine learning and computational text analysis to unpack the myriad stories that 
these critical documents tell. 
A. Charter Texts 
Over the course of several years, we have been assembling a comprehensive 
textual dataset containing present and historical charters of almost 3,000 of the largest 
publicly traded companies in the United States. Our dataset is based exclusively on 
digitized filings with the SEC made available on the EDGAR database, therefore 
ensuring our ability to share it as an open-source resource.  
To ensure accuracy and comprehensive coverage, we harvest charters manually, 
with the help of a small army of research assistants. Doing so allows us to avoid the 
many pitfalls of the automated approaches evidently used by commercial services. We 
use a formal organizational hierarchy and numerous quality-control measures to 
exercise quality control over our collection efforts. Senior members of the team (law 
school graduates and advanced JD candidates) cross-checked most information 
assembled by junior research assistants.106  
 
enforcing these provisions. See, e.g., Lancaster, supra note 20 (documenting the case of a legal-tech startup 
that was driven from business from a lawsuit filed by Westlaw’s parent company).  
105 Our investigation of Westlaw’s main competitors revealed nearly identical terms-of-use 
prohibitions, but with inferior search functionality. Lexis, for example, seems to require users to search 
for specific terms or companies, which curtails the ability to even pull up all NASDAQ companies at 
once.  
106 More details on our data gathering protocols can be found in Appendix B. Although we 
consider our collection protocol to be a significant improvement over standard commercial providers, 
the biggest advantage of our dataset is its open-source nature. We make the dataset available to the 
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The resulting dataset contains the chartering histories for 2,899 companies, 
starting with the first fully restated charter the company uploaded onto EDGAR. For 
many companies, this is the first full charter that was filed after EDGAR went live in 
1995. For a majority of companies (around 58%), however, we are able to trace their 
charter history well back into the 1990s.107 In some cases (approximately 12%), we 
successfully extract a chartering history to a year prior to 1990. Based on this harvested 
information, we construct a textual corpus that treats an issuer’s charter document in a given 
measuring year as the observational unit. In other words, our dataset has a “panel” 
structure, observing the charter text(s) that governed the internal affairs of each active 
company as of January 1 of each year between 1990 and 2019.108  
Even without elaborate data crunching, our corpus renders some interesting 
insights about public company charters over time. Consider charter length. In principle, 
certificates of incorporation could be quite short, with most of the nitty-gritty baked 
into other governance documents (such as bylaws).109 Indeed, most state statutes 
require charters to have only a few informational ingredients,110 and they can be shorter 
than 75 words.111 Public company charters are typically longer, but are still relatively 
 
public, and we invite others to contribute to it and correct any mistakes that escaped our quality control 
measures. We return to this point infra Part IV. 
107 A notable paper started down a route similar to ours, but ultimately chose a different path for 
a different purpose. See Cremers & Ferrell, supra note 10. There the authors tracked approximately 1,000 
companies from the IRRC data set backwards in time to the 1978-89 era. The authors did not attempt 
to audit the G-Index itself over the IRRC years, but instead used a random sample of IRRC observations 
from 1990 in order to emulate the labeling conventions of the IRRC. Id. at 1172. They do not report 
on error rates they discovered in the IRRC, nor do they attempt to assess whether the IRRC’s 
conventions were consistent with objective legal judgments. Unlike this paper, the authors did not 
collect the raw corpus of governance documents; but instead focused on generating labels only. (Neither 
their labels nor their constructed index is available to the public, though they evidently have made their 
constructed index available to select researchers.) 
108 Although we relegate most of our data collection protocols to Appendix B, one detail warrants 
attention here. When a typical issuer amends its charter, its disclosure frequently takes the form of a 
focused statement of the amendment, unaccompanied by a de novo restatement of the entire amended 
charter. In fact, several such piecemeal disclosures will often stack up before an issuer wrangles them 
into a full restatement. Manually interlacing such amendments into the pre-existing charters proved 
infeasible. Instead, we aggregated full restatements and partial amendments as follows: For each issuer 
in any year, we consider its charter to consist of (a) the most recently disclosed full charter, appended 
by (b) all disclosed partial amendments executed after the restatement in (a) but before the observation 
year. This protocol preserves information, but also may lead to some distortions (such as the measured 
length of a charter). Therefore, where appropriate (such as in Figure 2 below), we limit attention to only 
the most recent full restatement (suppressing any intervening partial amendments). 
109 See generally Nili & Hwang, supra note 85. 
110 Typically, they require (a) the name of corporation; (b) its purpose or nature of its business; (c) 
its official address; (d) a description of corporation's capital structure; and (e) duration of corporation's 
existence. Some statutes require descriptions of the incorporators, paid-in capital, and initial board 
structure. See 1 Corp. Forms § 2:2, Marvin Hyman and Publisher’s Editorial Staff (2020). 
111 See, e.g., Form 1.01: Articles of Incorporation (Legal Minimum),  in Robert Brown, Jr., Herbert 
B. Max & Stacey L. Bowers, Raising Capital: Private Placement Forms & Techniques (3d ed. 1995). 
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brief. In practice, however, the (full versions of) charters of publicly traded companies 
are far longer, typically ranging between 1,000 and 12,000 words.  
Figure 2: Mean Word Length (Full Charter Restatements) 
 
Figure 2 reports how the average length of charters has changed over time, with 
Delaware-incorporated issuers in black and non-Delaware companies in gray. 
Interestingly, the mean charter length for firms incorporated in Delaware has held 
steady (or even modestly shrunk) over the past 30 years, while that of non-Delaware 
firms has grown precipitously. In the early 1990s, a typical non-Delaware charter was 
30% shorter than that of a typical Delaware-based corporation. In the last decade, in 
fact, this gap has not only closed but even been reversed slightly.112 
 
112 In Figure 2, we report the mean based on the length of all full charters in the dataset for active 
companies at a given point in time. This implies that the sample of companies (both in Delaware and 
elsewhere) changes over time. However, the results reported above remain substantially similar when 
we restrict the sample to companies that appear in the full panel of the dataset. 
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Figure 3: Mean Flesch-Kincaid Readability Scores (Full Restatements) 
 
Another constructive measure of our charters corpus explores their overall 
readability. To what extent can a layperson read and understand the content of this 
foundational governance document? To get a handle on this question, we assessed our 
corpus of charters against the well-known Flesch-Kincaid (F-K) scale. Originally 
developed by the U.S. military to assess the content of mechanical instructional 
manuals, F-K scores are calculated on the basis of the average length of words and 
sentences in a document. The score proxies proportionally to readability, so that the 
higher the score of a document, the easier it is to read. F-K scores below a score of 
10.0 are considered to be the most challenging, appropriate to a professional trained 
in the field. (Obvious candidate groups here might be lawyers, board members, and 
executives.)113  
For the most part, as Figure 3 suggests, the charters in our corpus are not breezy 
page-turners. In fact, corporate charters in Delaware in particular have always been 
within the hardest tranche of the F-K scale. Perhaps more interesting is the fact that 
much like with length, non-Delaware charters in our dataset have been closing the 
readability gap, too. One potential explanation is more heavy “lawyering” of public 
company governance documents during the 1990s and early 2000s—a time period 
coinciding precisely with the rise of quantitative governance research and enhanced 
shareholder activism. 
Although we will circle back to explore several of these (and other) textual 
attributes of our corpus later in this article, it warrants noting that this is the first time 
(to our knowledge) metrics like these have even been possible on a widespread panel 
of corporate charters.114 That observation alone underscores the great potential of the 
CCG as a tool to unlock empirical governance along untold dimensions. 
 
113 For more detail on the F-K scores, see infra Online Appendix C. 
114 Nili and Hwang, for instance, used this technique to analyze audit committee charters. See Nili 
& Hwang, supra note 85. 
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B. Data Labels 
Notwithstanding the several interesting acontextual measures of our corpus, 
significant additional work is required to distill the substantive legal content from the 
textual contents of documents (a process that is often referred to as “labeling” the 
corpus). Here, there is no substitute for reading the documents and deploying lawyerly 
judgment (an exercise that lawyers do quite well). Thus, in a parallel effort to the 
harvesting and cleaning of the raw charter corpus, we also develop two related labeled 
datasets.115 The first (and most painstaking to produce) involves manually labeling the 
content of the harvested charters along several dimensions.116 We developed a detailed 
common rubric that requires a variety of quantitative and textual inputs. The first few 
of these inputs relate to document “meta-data” (such as execution date, company 
identifiers, state of incorporation and whether the document was a full restatement or 
a partial amendment). The remaining pertain to substantive governance choices as 
reflected in the text of the charter. Our rubric requires the coder to read, identify, label, 
and extract relevant language from the charter pertaining to 28 governance provisions 
in each chartering document.117 We took great care in both designing uniform labeling 
protocols and training our research team. We double- and triple-assigned identical 
labeling tasks to our less experienced coders to detect and redress labeling 
inconsistencies. Senior members of the team also acted as supervisors to adjudicate 
differences in coding styles and to flag challenging issues with the entire team in weekly 
progress meetings.118  
Second, we supplement the firm-level observations with a state-level labeled dataset 
tracking sixteen statutory governance rules119 across all 50 states (and the District of 
Columbia) from 1990 to 2019. Here the then-prevailing statutory mandates are labeled 
not only for their substantive content, but also whether companies are permitted to 
opt out of the statute, what sort of measures are required to effectuate an opt out, and 
whether companies opting out are required to choose from a constrained set of 
 
115 The term “labeled” refers to using human judgment to rank, classify, or assess the content of 
a text (or portion thereof). See JIAFENG GUO & YANYAN LAN, INST. OF COMPUT. TECH., CHINESE 
ACAD. OF SCIS., TOP-K LEARNING TO RANK: LABELING, RANKING AND EVALUATION 751-52 (2015), 
http://www.bigdatalab.ac.cn/~lanyanyan/papers/2012/SIGIR2012-niu.pdf. Nearly all existing 
corporate governance databases are themselves labeled databases. The CCG, in contrast, includes both 
unlabeled content (the raw corpus) and labeled content (described herein). 
116 We take some care to elucidate these steps here for the sake of future researchers who will use 
this database, and in light of the relatively opaque documentation that attends other corporate 
governance datasets. See supra Part I. 
117 Many of these pieces of information later made it possible to match our documents to issuer 
information from external datasets, as demonstrated below. A description of our labeling protocol is 
included in Appendix B. 
118 We used a formal organizational hierarchy similar to the one employed for charter harvesting. 
See infra Appendix B. 
119 Id. 
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options.120 In all cases, state law provisions were labeled by either the authors or 
advanced law students under the direct supervision of the authors. 
Figure 4: Mean Governance Characteristics of Charters and State Statutes121 
         
 
 
When combined with the textual corpus, the associated labeled datasets allow us 
to track dozens of governance characteristics, across companies and over time. 
Although space constraints prevent us from highlighting every single facet here, we 
highlight a few interesting trends in the four panels of Figure 4. Each panel of the 
 
120 See supra Figure 1 and related text.  
121 Although three of the panels in the Figure reflect the substantive state background rule, 
statutory heterogeneity precludes illustrating other dimensions of the background rule, such as whether 
it is a default or immutable rule, what type of document (if any) is required to opt out, and what a 
company’s opt-out choices are. These considerations, however, will come into play in the next 
subsection, when we use our database to assess (and correct) the contents of existing governance 
datasets, such as the IRRC. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3796628
Cleaning Corporate Governance 26 
figure tracks the extent to which charters in our corpus reflect one of four different 
types of governance provisions: (i) Multiple classes of common stock; (ii) staggered 
boards; (iii) prohibitions on shareholder action by written consent; and (iv) 
prohibitions on special meetings. In the latter three categories, we also track the 
substantive background content of the relevant state law provision(s) for each issuer 
(based on the substantive content of the then-prevailing statute for the state of 
incorporation). The interaction between state law and our charter coding is important, 
since state law may provide these governance provisions even if they are not 
specifically elected in the charter. 
Consider first multi-class (or dual-class) common stock provisions. These 
provisions allow founders to maintain control of their companies even after their 
equity stake is dilute, and are a hot topic of debate among investors and governance 
experts.122 Charters are required to spell out the capital structure of the corporation, 
and the provision for multiple classes of common stock is easily tracked. Issuers with 
multi-class common oscillate somewhat over our sampling period, rising continuously 
to a peak at just under 16% in 2001, generally declining thereafter. Although not 
pictured here, it also bears noting that when multiple classes of common stock are 
authorized in the charter within our sample, it is overwhelmingly likely that they will 
not carry equal voting rights and privileges on a per-share across the board. Around 
78% of the issuers with multi-class common stock in our sample each year articulate 
unequal per-share voting rights, a ratio that remains roughly constant over time. 
Moving to the second panel, consider staggered board composition—a structure 
that typically designates three overlapping classes of directors whose terms interlace 
(much like the US Senate), so that only one third of the directors are up for re-election 
in any given year. Staggered boards are typically considered to be a key way to delay 
and/or deter a hostile takeover or proxy contest.123 Express provisions in the charter 
that stagger the board are common in our data, and we find them in around 45% of 
our charters overall. That said, the frequency of charter-authorized board staggering 
provisions has declined discernibly over the last several years, and by 2019 they were 
a clear minority (around 39%). This trend is no doubt due to the significant pressure 
that proxy advisers and other shareholder watchdogs have placed on board staggering 
 
122 See e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock, 103 
VA. L. REV. 585 (2017) (reviewing prior literature highlighting the costs of dual class and making the 
case against perpetual dual class shares); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Perils of Small-Minority 
Controllers, 107 GEO L.J. 1453 (2019); Daniel R. Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual 
Class Common Stock, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 119, 136–39 (1987) (arguing that dual-class stock facilitates long-
term planning); Zohar Goshen  &  Assaf  Hamdani, Corporate  Control  and  Idiosyncratic  Vision,  125  
YALE L.J.  560, 566–67 (2016) (arguing that dual class could be value enhancing); John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Dual Class Stock: The Shades of Sunset, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Nov. 19, 2018), 
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2018/11/19/dual-class-stock-the-shades-of-sunset/(describing 
academics and practitioners as “polarized” over dual class structures). 
123 See Gompers et al., supra note 6, at 145-52. 
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provisions in recent years.124 Additionally, the background law of four states require 
(or at some point required) staggering of public companies,125 and about 3% of our 
firms (in an average year) are incorporated in such states.  
A topic of growing importance in contemporary governance debates is the extent 
to which shareholders enjoy significant latitude to engage (or be engaged) in activism, 
via written consent rights or the ability to call special meetings.126 Each of these rights 
substantially tips the balance of power in control away from the board and towards 
the hands of shareholders. Such governance devices are reflected in the third and 
fourth panels of the Figure. With respect to written consent rights, our charters 
manifest a growing proclivity to either prohibit such actions outright or to effectively 
do by imposing a requirement that all shareholders entitled to vote must act 
unanimously via written consent (a functional impossibility for public companies). The 
bottom left panel lumps these two effective prohibitions together, and it shows that 
effective prohibitions on written consents are expressly provided for in about 16% of 
our charters overall; that fraction, however, has been growing dramatically, from next 
to nothing at the beginning of our sample to fully a third of issuers by the end. In 
addition, about a third of the issuers in our sample are subject to state laws that 
effectively prohibit written consent actions (all by imposing a unanimity 
requirement).127  
Now consider provisions that prohibit shareholders from forcing the convening 
of special meetings. Here we once again see a clear increasing trend toward express 
prohibition through charter provisions over time, growing from near zero to around 
one fifth of the charters by the end of our sample period. However, in those cases 
explicitly granting shareholders a right to convene a special meeting, the mean 
triggering percentage is around 33% on average (and has been falling since the 1990s). 
In addition, the state law of several states does not grant shareholders the right by 
 
124 Id. 
125 See IOWA CODE § 490.806A; IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-33-6(c); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156B, § 
50A, ch. 156D, § 8.06(b)–(g); OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1027(D)(2) (repealed effective Mar. 5, 2013). 
126 See Gompers et al., supra note 6, at 145-52. 
127 See ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.423; ALA. CODE § 10A-2A-7.04; ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-26-710; ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-704; CAL. CORP. CODE § 603; COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-107-104; CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 33-698; D.C. CODE § 29-305.04; FLA. STAT. § 607.0704; GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-704; HAW. 
REV. STAT. § 414-124; IDAHO CODE § 30-29-704; IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-29-4; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 271B.7-040; LA. STAT. ANN. § 12:1-704; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156D, § 7.04; MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. 
& ASS’NS § 2-505; ME. STAT. tit. 13-C, § 704; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.1407; MINN. STAT. § 302A.441; 
MO.REV. STAT. § 351.273; MISS. CODE. ANN. § 79-4-7.04; MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-14-704; N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 55-7-04; N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-75; NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-256; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
293-A:7.04; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:5-6; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-18-8; N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 615; OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.54; OR. REV. STAT. § 60.211; 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2524; 7 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 
7-1.2-707; S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-7-104; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-1A-704; TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-
17-104; TX BUS. ORGS. § 6.201-202; UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-704; VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-657; VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 7.04; WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.07.040; WIS. STAT. § 180.0704; W. VA. CODE § 
31D-7-704; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-704. 
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default to convene special meetings, and such statutes affected about 70% of our firms 
(a number that includes Delaware corporations—at nearly three fifths of our 
sample).128 
It is important to keep in mind that the interplay between state law and private 
ordering can sometimes be subtle in ways not fully captured in Figure 4. As we noted 
earlier, corporate governance documents can (and frequently do) attempt to opt out 
of the background state rule, which can (and frequently does) give way if the opt-out 
is executed appropriately. It is critical to keep track of all of these factors in assessing 
whether a particular governance device is present (or absent) in a company in any given 
observation year. For example, state law affects whether a board-staggering is already 
the presumptive rule in the jurisdiction. And state law similarly dictates whether opting 
out is possible, and if so, whether opting out must be done via the charter, or instead 
could be done in a lower-level document (shareholder approved bylaws, ordinary 
bylaws, board resolutions, and the like). And for those companies that opt out, state 
law may further constrain the number of overlapping classes of directors that are 
permitted when a firm opts out (often a maximum of three). The panels of Figure 4 
account for only charter contents and background state rule as self-contained matters, 
with none of the additional interplay. In later sections, however, we take pains to carry 
through this interplay when we compare the CCG database to other existing corporate 
governance data. 
C. Reassessing What We Know (or Thought We Knew) about Corporate 
Governance 
The CCG database—including both the raw corpus and the labeled datasets—
gives us a powerful set of new tools to analyze governance characteristics at the firm 
level. This ability, in turn, also makes it possible (for the first time) to tabulate side-by-
side comparisons of the CCG database with other oft-used governance metrics. One 
that merits particular attention—and the most renowned source of firm-level 
corporate governance metrics in the law and finance literature—is the “ISS Legacy” 
(aka IRRC) database, discussed at length in the prior section. In the pages that follow, 
we set about comparing the CCG database to the individual items in the IRRC, in 
order to assess their accuracy. At the risk of issuing an academic spoiler alert, the 
results of this exercise reveal that our worst fears about data integrity have come to 
pass: as explained below, we uncover an alarming pattern of miscodes in numerous of 
the governance dimensions that comprise the G-Index (and its variations). The errors 
are so widespread, in fact, that even under a conservative error-detection protocol, we estimate that 
the G-index is coded incorrectly more than 80% of the time.  
 
128 See ALA. CODE § 10A-2A-7.02; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211; IND. CODE § 23-1-29-2; KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 17-6501; MO. REV. STAT. § 351.225; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-02; N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW 
§ 602; OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1056; OR. REV. STAT. § 60.204; 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2521; 7 R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 7-1.2-701; S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-7-102; VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-655. 
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But before going there, it is instructive first to illustrate with a specific example 
how we assess and classify potential errors: director exculpation provisions, one of the 24 
variables included in the G-Index. Lawyers, professors, and corporate law students 
know these provisions well. In all states that permit and/or imply them (and by 2003 
all did), an exculpation provision shields directors (and in some cases officers) from 
monetary liability for breaching their fiduciary duty of care. Such statutes do not 
typically deny injunctive relief, nor do they permit exculpation for conduct that (among 
other things) would be disloyal, would lack good faith, or would constitute corporate 
waste.129 There is nonetheless some substantive variation among states’ mandates. For 
example, in five states, the statutory rule exculpates directors automatically without 
needing an implementing charter provision.130 And two of those states go even further, 
making director exculpation immutable.131 Among the states where exculpation 
remains a default rule (in either direction), some permit firms to opt out of the rule via 
one or more governance documents that sit at a “lower” echelon than the charter (such 
as a bylaw provision).132 
As far as we are able to discern, the IRRC database never considered much (if 
any) of the statutory heterogeneity described above, ignoring (for example) whether 
the state’s background rule already exculpates directors, or how/whether a firm might 
opt out of that mandate. Instead, the IRRC seems to have limited its labeling attention 
to a counting exercise based on an issuer’s corporate governance documents (which 
we conjecture focused on corporate charters, though we do not know for sure). Our 
approach, in contrast, pays close attention to the interplay between statutory mandates 
and governance documents.133  
 
129 Delaware’s famous “102(b)(7)” statutory provision provides the most common template. DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7). There, as in the vast majority of other states, exculpation for a breach of 
duty of care is not preordained by statute, but instead may be adopted by the corporation through 
express exculpation provision if done via the charter. West Virginia was the last to add an exculpation 
statute, following this same enabling template in 2002, see W. VA. CODE § 31D-2-202. But see IND. CODE 
§ 23-1-35-1 (where exculpation also covers loyalty and good faith). 
130 See FLA. STAT. § 607.0831; IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1; NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.138; OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 1701.59; WIS. STAT. § 180.0828. 
131 See FLA. STAT. § 607.0831; IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1. 
132 These include Pennsylvania, 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 513 (shareholder-promulgated bylaw); 
Minnesota, MINN. STAT. § 302A.111 (bylaw); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59 
(bylaw/regulation) and Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-841 (bylaw and/or shareholder-promulgated 
resolution). 
133 To put a finer point on it, a corporation’s directors may enjoy exculpation protection in one of 
multiple scenarios: (1) the state’s background rule already prescribes exculpation subject to an 
immutable rule; (2) the state’s background rule prescribes exculpation as a default rule, and the 
corporation has not attempted to opt out with using statutorily prescribed means; or (3) the state’s 
statute prescribes a default rule that does not prescribe exculpation, but allows the corporation to 
contract out pursuant to a statutorily prescribed means and the corporation has done so. The IRRC 
database does not appear to have used any of these criteria, but instead uses a less-specific version of 
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To assess the accuracy of the IRRC against our CCG database, we entertain 
alternative strategies for identifying mis-codes, which we define as “permissive” and 
“conservative” strategies. The permissive approach would simply ask whether there is 
an inconsistency between what we observe in a company’s charter and what is 
contained in the IRRC. Under this approach, any inconsistencies are deemed to be 
errors by the IRRC. The conservative approach, in contrast, identifies an inconsistency 
as a miscode only if it is impossible (in light of charter text and the underlying statutory 
framework) for the IRRC’s designation to be correct as a legal matter.  
To see how these criteria work in practice, consider again the exculpation 
example. Suppose ABC Inc. is a Delaware corporation whose 2006 charter comprises 
part of our dataset. Suppose further the IRRC represents that the company exculpated 
directors in 2006, but our corpus does not reflect any such provision in the charter for 
that year. The permissive approach would immediately deem this inconsistency to be 
a miscode. The conservative approach requires more steps, taking account of the fact 
that, as of 2006: (a) Delaware law did not grant default exculpation to directors; (b) 
Delaware did allow opt-outs through an exculpation provision; and (c) any attempt to 
opt out must have been reflected in the charter to have legal effect. Applying these criteria, 
the conservative approach would also register an error: for the lack of an express 
exculpation term in ABC’s 2006 charter, combined with the contours of Delaware law 
as of 2006, necessarily imply that the IRRC label could not possibly be correct.134 
The two panels of Figure 5 compare the IRRC’s exculpation designation to the 
CCG dataset over time, under each of these two aforementioned approaches. The left 
panel compares the IRRC designations for all issuers by year (bars) against all issuers 
of the CCG dataset (lines). The red line corresponds to the permissive approach, 
tracking the mean number of issuers per year that have an express exculpation 
provision in the company charter. The blue line tracks the conservative approach, 
factoring in the statutory regime of each firm’s state of incorporation as well. The right 
panel renders a similar comparison, but it confines attention to only the set of 
companies where we have a positive match between the CCG and IRRC datasets (a 
limitation that drops all but the observation years covered by the IRRC, scattered 
sporadically between 1990 and 2006).  
 
criterion (3) with no attention to the statutory background requirements. Our approach, in contrast, 
marshals all three steps described above. 
134 Notice that our conservative error-detection protocol might reach a different outcome from 
the permissive one if ABC were incorporated in a different state—such as Ohio—which allows 
corporations to opt out through a lower “echelon” document (i.e., a bylaw provision). In this case, if 
the IRRC reflects exculpation but we do not observe such a provision in the charter, we cannot deem 
a miscode to have occurred under the conservative rubric, since it is at least possible that the firm executed 
its exculpation regime through a bylaw provision (which our chartering corpus and labels do not track). 
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Figure 5: CCG-IRRC Comparison of Director Exculpation Provisions 
 
As one can see from the CCG trendlines—and consistent with the longstanding 
view of judges and practitioners135—exculpation provisions have grown close to 
ubiquitous, and they were already on a strong growth trajectory by 1990, shortly after 
Delaware began by statutory change to allow them in 1986.136 By 2006, around 85% 
of all issuers (and 96% of Delaware corporations) had such provisions in their charter. 
In contrast, and for reasons that would likely befuddle most corporate lawyers, the 
IRRC data suggest a strong opposite trend, implying that only 27% of all issuers (and 
32% of Delaware corporations) exculpated directors by 2006. This striking divergence 
is present in both the unmatched and matched subsamples, and it persists even if we 
ignore state law super-structures, limiting our attention to express provisions in the 
charter.137 Note further that the IRRC’s miscoding problem appears to grow worse (not 
better) in time. Lacking a helpful description of the IRRC’s labeling protocols, we can 
only speculate why the dataset appears so alarmingly inaccurate on exculpation. One 
possibility—consistent with machine learning text analysis we describe in the next 
section—is that drafting protocols for charter provisions likely became more 
“lawyerly” and technical during much of the early 2000s—a transition that may have 
caused readers with limited legal training to overlook exculpation terms that featured 
technical language. 
 
135 See Randy J. Holland, Delaware Directors’ Fiduciary Duties: The Focus on Loyalty, 11 PA. J. BUS. L. 
675, 691-93 (2009). 
136 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102. 
137 Tabulating at the company level, the IRRC misclassifies exculpation rights 51% of the time 
using the permissive approach and 52% of the time using the conservative approach. Note that the 
conservative approach yields a higher error rate (at least on this dimension), because by construction it 
takes into account state-level statutory provisions—which IRRC appears to ignore completely. 
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D. Aggregating G-Index Errors 
Director exculpation provisions are but one example of seventeen individual 
governance characteristics on which the CCG enables us to audit the accuracy of the 
IRRC and G-Index. We conducted a similar set of comparisons to other analogous 
variables in our labeled dataset, and the results of this comparison are captured in 
Table 1. To simplify, the table reports error rates using the permissive rubric, and it 
defines a provision to be a “Positive” when the IRRC reflects it to be present and a 
“Negative” otherwise. If the IRRC coding matches our charter coding in the CCG 
database, we further deem the IRRC coding to be “True” and otherwise “False”. The 
table thus tracks “True Positive” (“True Negative”) designations—where our data and 
the IRRC agree about the presence (absence) of a provision—as well as “False 
Positive” (“False Negative”) designations, in which the IRRC indicates a provision to 
be present (absent) and our labeled data reveal the opposite. The table then lays out 
correct classification rates, error rates, and F1 scores (a conventional way to assess 
classification accuracy balancing false positives and false negatives138). 
Because of lack of documentation on definitions in the IRRC data, the Table 
defines certain features according to multiple criteria. We found that blank check 
preferred stock could fall into one of several categories. We also found that 
supermajority charter amendment provisions could be construed narrowly (only if they 
pertain to the entire charter) or broadly (also if they pertain to the whole charter or 
enumerated portions of the charter). Note from the table that while some of the 
metrics are relatively sound, others are particularly problematic. Averaging across all 
listed dimensions, our data suggest that the IRRC data errs at least 20% of the time.  
 
138 The F1 designates the harmonic mean between “precision” (the fraction of true positives to all 
classified positives) and “recall” (the fraction of true positives to all actual positives). The score is bounded 
between 0 and 1, with higher scores suggesting a more accurate classification. F1 is a commonly used 
metric in text analysis and binary classification. For more, see Pozen, Talley & Nyarko, supra note 15, at 
33. 
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Table 1: Inconsistencies Between the IRRC and CCG Data Labels 
 
These all seem like relatively large overall error rates. What does it imply for the 
G-Index, which amalgamates all of them? As discussed earlier, the G-Index has 
become easily the most prominent corporate governance index in the literature, 
spawning litany of variations. And since the index is computed by summing the several 
indicator variables in the IRRC database, we are also in a unique position to use our 
labeled dataset to reevaluate the G-Index, correcting it on an item-by-item basis in 
situations where we found evidence of a clear miscode.  
To implement our corrections, we utilized the conservative approach described 
above to detect and then correct miscodes. For each firm observed in each year of the 
IRRC, we began with the value of the G-Index as reported in the IRRC dataset. For 
the issuers we could match, we moved incrementally through the binary governance 
variables one at a time, determining (per the conservative approach) whether there was 
an unmistakable coding error in the IRRC. If none was found, we moved onto the next 
variable. If there was an unmistakable coding error, we manually corrected the value 
of the index by one point upwards or downwards (depending on the variable). We 
repeated this process ad seriatim for all matched issuers and all years in the IRRC 
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database until we had exhausted the list of labeled variables tracked in the CCG data 
that corresponded to elements of the G-Index.139 
By way of illustration, recall that in our director exculpation example above, it 
became clear that the IRRC erroneously indicated that ABC Inc. had exculpated 
directors when in fact it had not. Because the existence of an exculpation provision 
would ordinarily imply an increase in the firm’s G-Index during that year, it follows 
that the G-Index for ABC must have been erroneously increased by one, reflecting 
this faulty exculpation designation. Our protocol corrected that mistake, reducing the 
G-Index of the firm in that year by one point. A similar process—crossing charter 
contents and state law—applies to all other analogous variables comprising the 
index.140  
We reiterate that we take care to make these adjustments only when there is a clear 
error in the IRRC, as per the conservative approach. Thus, in some cases where our 
labeled datasets and the IRRC conflict, we might still refrain from making an 
adjustment, because we cannot satisfy the clear error standard. We thus give the IRRC 
the benefit of the doubt even in cases where we have grounds to suspect a coding 
error. 
Consider first our assessment of errors along a very simple metric: For those firms 
and years where a comparison was possible, how frequently was the reported G-Index 
score incorrect? As illustrated in Table 2, the answer is alarming. Averaging over all 
years and all matched companies, we find the G-index to be inaccurate over four-fifths of the 
time (82.95%). More disconcertingly, as with director exculpation, we find the 
incidence of error grows in magnitude over time (from 73.68% in 1990 to 88.58% in 
2006), even as the database was generating increased attention among academics, 
regulators and practitioners.  
 We emphasize that this error rate is almost certainly a lower bound, since we 
deployed the conservative error correction rubric, intervening only for unambiguous 
errors; we made no corrections to probable errors when it was still possible that the 
IRRC reflected a provision not in our corpus (such as bylaws, contracts, and so forth). 
The estimated error rate also errs on the conservative side because our labels do not 
track every single one of the elements that comprise the index. Notwithstanding these 
constraints that bias our miscoding estimates downward, this is a distressing error rate 
for a core dataset that has long been the very foundation of empirical corporate 
governance research. 
 
139 When we were unable to match an IRRC firm to the CCG, we left the G-Index intact. We 
exclude these unmatched firms in the discussion that immediately follows, but we include them in 
several of our replications of the GIM results in the subsequent subsection. 
140 A description of our protocol is included in Appendix B.  
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Table 2: G-Index Coding Error Incidence, by Year (Matched Issuers) 
 
Of course, the mere existence of an error in the index may not be fatal if its 
magnitude constitutes something akin to rounding error. In other words, if the overall 
size of the observation error remains modest, perhaps the noise detected above might 
not be too troubling.141 Our data permit analysis here as well; and we also find 
substantial cause for concern. The histogram in Figure 6 demonstrates the overall 
magnitudes of the G-Index errata (even with our conservative rubric for correction). 
It exhibits considerable variation in our matched firms, with an overall standard 
deviation of 1.83. Relative to the variability of the G-index as a whole (whose standard 
deviation is 2.71142), that is a distressing noise to signal ratio. 
The aggregated errors we detect using the CCG database not only introduce 
considerable noise, but also a discernible bias. Specifically, our corrections reveal an 
additional downward bias in the G-Index of around -0.75 points overall, one that grows 
worse (not better) over time, as the right-hand panel of Figure 6 illustrates. By 2006, 
even under our conservative re-coding protocol, G-Index retains roughly the same 
degree of measurement error variability, but compounds it with a downward bias of 
nearly 2 points. 
 
141 We allow for this possibility with a scholarly grain of salt, given the 80%+ error rate reported 
in the text. Indeed, given this error rate, the best-case scenario for salvaging the G-Index against the 
woes of measurement error would be if it were exactly right 20% of the time, too low by one point 40% 
of the time, and too high by one point the remaining 40%. In that case, the overall index would be 
unbiased on average, but the errors would still have a standard deviation of around 0.9, fully one-third 
the size of the standard deviation in the G-Index itself (of 2.71 in our matched data). 
142 As noted above, the standard deviation of the G-Index for our matched company-years is also 
2.71, suggesting that our matching protocol rendered a representative set of matches. 
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Figure 6: Miscode Error Magnitudes and CCG Corrections to G-Index 
 
At the risk of some overkill, we emphasize once again that our error-correction 
approach errs strongly on the side of conservatism in several ways. First, we re-
assessed only 17 of the 24 criteria in the GIM database that are confirmable from our 
charter texts and labeled datasets. Moreover, we avoided hazarding a guess (even an 
educated one) on whether various dimensions were likely miscoded, and we only 
corrected those inputs that we could be certain were mis specified, leaving in place 
designations where we could not identify an error with certainty. 
 It warrants noting that our choice to highlight flaws in the G-Index and IRRC 
specifically is strictly a matter of authorial choice, warranted (in our view) by the index’s 
prominence in the literature and its centrality to appreciable follow-on research (such 
as the E-Index, O-Index, and D-index to name a few). That said, we are by no means 
limited to this particular single comparison: The CCG can easily be recruited into a 
quantitative battle of the bands with other well-known governance databases. In 
Online Appendix C, for example, we show how the CCG stacks up against a different 
source: the contemporary ISS governance database (2007-present)—one that itself has 
attracted considerable academic attention (but contains insufficient data to reassemble 
the G-Index). There, we find a disconcerting pattern of misclassification rates too, 
comparable to those illustrated above, reinforcing our concerns about data integrity 
and accuracy. 
E. The Arbitrage Value of Good Governance Revisited 
Having shown that the CCG dataset exposes disconcerting errors in popular 
corporate governance indices, an immediate next question concerns assessing what 
that implies for the field more broadly. As noted above, scores of “folk wisdoms” 
from empirical corporate governance were generated from these data, many of which 
are now among the most well-known in the field. Do they hold up? 
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Testing all the implications would take more time, space, and reader patience than 
is achievable here; but for the sake of illustration, we return once again to the G-Index, 
using our CCG corpus to reassess one of the most famous empirical findings in all of 
law and finance, from GIM.143 As noted above, their seminal examination introduced 
the G-index, for the first time peering into granular, firm-specific governance practices 
and linking them to various financial performance metrics. Perhaps the most famous 
finding was that “good governance” is also an arbitrage opportunity. More precisely, 
GIM showed that a “long-short” investment strategy of buying “democratic” firms (in 
the lowest decile of the G-index) and short-selling “dictatorial” firms (in the highest 
decile) would systematically outperform the market by 71 basis points per month (the 
equivalent of an astonishing 8.9% per year144). This finding was (and remains) a striking 
result, a serviceable cocktail-party table topic, and a veritable modern-day slogan that 
informs policy and academic debates in corporate governance the world over.145 
A now-obvious red flag, however, is that the result depends critically on the 
contents of the IRRC database—the very same resource that we showed to be 
alarmingly inaccurate. Might this inaccuracy have infected their ultimate results (not to 
mention the hundreds of scholarly contributions that followed after)?  
The answer is not clear on a priori grounds. On the one hand, the GIM results 
could grow even stronger once the miscodes are rectified: This is what one might 
ordinarily expect when an independent variable (like G-Index) is muddled by random 
observation error.146 In that case, cleaner data would be expected to sharpen and 
amplify the original results. On the other hand, data infirmities can sometimes be the 
root cause of an evident statistical result, typically when such infirmities are not the 
artifact of random noise. In this case, the effect of cleaner data can weaken the results. 
And for the G-Index errors, it is not clear a priori which of these stories is most likely 
to hold.147 
 
143 Gompers et al., supra note 6. 
144 For those keeping score, a basis point is simply 1/100 of a percentage point, and thus 
conversion into an excess return is given by (1+0.0071)12 - 1= 0.089, or 8.9%. 
145 See supra notes 45-59 and accompanying text. 
146 This effect is sometimes referred to as “classical” measurement error, and it represents the case 
where the measurement error of a variable is independent of the variable’s “true” value. See John Bound,  
Charles Brown & Nancy Mathiowetz, Measurement Error in Survey Data, in 5 HANDBOOK OF 
ECONOMETRICS 3705–843 (James J. Heckman & Edward Leamer eds., 2001); Darren H. Lubotsky & 
Martin Wittenberg, Interpretation of Regressions with Multiple Proxies, 88 REV. ECON. & STAT. 549 (2006); 
Aaron Chalfin & Justin McCrary, Are U.S. Cities Underpoliced? Theory and Evidence, 100 REV. ECON. & 
STAT. 167 (2018). 
147 Our best a priori guess would be on the latter, however. Because the G-Index is the aggregation 
of two dozen dummy variables, it is a likely candidate for non-classical measurement error. The most 
extreme version of this effect is for binary variables (where measurement error can never be classical 
by definition), but this problem afflicts bounded discrete variables too. Black et al., supra note 77, at 743. 
In fact, it merits observing that the most well-known result in GIM—which focuses on the two most 
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To investigate these questions, we set about reanalyzing the GIM governance-
arbitrage result using the CCG data. The fruits of this effort are contained in Table 3 
(which is fashioned after the portion of GIM that reports on the arbitrage result148). 
The first column of the table simply reproduces their reported results, with each row 
associated with an approximate decile of governance-indexed portfolios, ranging from 
no greater than 5 (democratic firms) to no less than 14 (dictatorial firms). The estimates 
reported in the table represent the unexplained return (or “Alpha”) generated by an 
investment in a value-weighted portfolio drawn from that decile,149 and consequently 
taking a “short” position in that portfolio would generate the same return with the 
opposite sign. Consequently, the difference between the most democratic portfolio’s 
Alpha and most dictatorial portfolio’s Alpha represents the unexplained return of the 
long-short investment described above. That difference generates their celebrated 71-
basis-point monthly return. The second column represents our best effort at an exact 
replication of GIM’s results with historical data from the IRRC. The remaining 
columns represent a re-estimation of their results using our CCG-corrected data under 
a variety of approaches. 
As one can see from the table, our exact replication (column 2) is nearly spot on 
with the original, bolstering confidence that we can, in fact, substantially replicate 
GIM’s findings with their own data. The third column represents our replication using 
the original GIM dataset, but one where we substituted the CCG-Index (i.e., the 
‘corrected’ G-index value as described above) for the reported one whenever we were 
able to generate a correction. It bears noting that during this period of years (1990-
1998), we faced limitations in matching up our dataset, and thus only about 42% of 
the GIM firm-years could be checked and corrected. In unmatched issuers, we simply 
continued to use their originally reported scores. Even with this modest correction, 
however, we estimate a discernible lower unexplained return to 59bps (representing a 
one-sixth attenuation from the original, the equivalent of a reduction in the 
unexplained annual spread from 8.9% to 7.3%). In the fourth column, we perform a 
similar analysis, but with a recently downloaded version of the IRRC database (which 
appears to have been modified slightly in 2010, subsequent to GIM’s original analysis), 
and the unexplained return dropped even further to 49.9bps (representing a reduction 
in the unexplained annual spread from 8.9% to 6.2%). Finally, in the fifth column we 
returned to the original IRRC dataset and ran our results with only our matched 
 
extreme deciles in the G-Index—is especially likely to exhibit non-classical measurement error. See Bound 
et al., supra note 146. 
148 See Gompers et al., supra note 6, at 123 tbl.VI. 
149 Specifically, the reported alpha values corresponded to the constant term of a four-factor Fama-
French-Carhart asset pricing estimation on monthly returns for each decile’s value-weighted portfolio. 
By construction, this constant represents the average return that cannot be explained by conventional 
asset pricing factors. Id.  
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firms.150 Here, we estimate an unexplained alpha of 55.9bps (representing a reduction 
in the unexplained annual spread from 8.9% to 6.9%). 
Table 3: Replication and Robustness of Good Governance as Arbitrage 
 
All told, our results strongly suggest that not only do the errors in the G-Index 
affect results, but that they do so in a disconcerting way. In each of the reported 
replications that use our corrected CCG-Index, the estimated abnormal return grows 
weaker—exactly the opposite movement from what one would expect had the G-Index 
merely been hamstrung by garden-variety measurement errors. Rather, each replication 
drives appreciably downward the estimated extent to which “good governance” 
predicts abnormally good returns to investors. Averaging across the columns, 
approximately a quarter of the 8.9% premium reported by GIM dissolves in the 
presence of corrected data. 
 
150 We confirmed that the GIM analysis with the uncorrected G-index data and matched firms 
delivers estimates almost exactly on par with the results reported in column 1. 
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It is worth noting that even with our corrections, the GIM arbitrage result does 
not “go away” completely. And accordingly, one could entertain the possibility that 
the original result—albeit reliant on imperfectly coded data—merely generated a result 
that was still ‘real’ but just a little too rosy. While we cannot rule out this possibility, 
we are skeptical. The fact that the attenuation effect is discernible after correcting only 
the matched firm-years (42%) with a deliberately conservative rubric raises serious 
concerns that Table 3 vastly understates the effect of the problem. And, reiterating our 
point above, the directionality of the change is particularly concerning, since it moves 
counter to what one would expect to see with classical measurement error adding just 
mere noise to the effect. 
Unpacking and testing these possibilities are beyond scope of this paper, so we 
leave that project to future research (at least for now). And there may be considerable 
unpacking left to do: as noted above, a substantial number of empirical corporate 
governance contributions of the last two decades rely on the same data sources as did 
GIM. At the same time, the open-source nature of the CCG database means that many 
scholars can participate in this enterprise. The above exercise (or something close to 
it) can be used to revisit the results of dozens of well-known empirical corporate 
governance results in the literature.151 
III. Corporate Governance as “Big Data” 
Although the CCG provides a powerful and novel way to reevaluate several old 
chestnuts of corporate governance, its primary—and most exciting—use is 
prospective. This section spotlights some of the ways that future scholars and 
policymakers can make use of the CCG. In particular, the CCG’s underlying textual 
corpus allows for emergent techniques that uses machine learning and computational 
text analysis.152 We explore some preliminary findings of our own using those 
techniques here. Such techniques, when applied to the CCG and its underlying corpus, 
have the potential both to improve on the accuracy of conventional empirical practices 
and to broaden the horizons of corporate governance research. 
A. Document-Level Trends 
First, the CCG corpus allows us to identify some interesting document-level 
trends. In Part II, we noted that some of the most rudimentary measures of our charter 
documents helped show that charters of non-Delaware companies have become 
longer and less readable over time, effectively converging with those of Delaware-
 
151 See Bebchuk et al., What Matters, supra note 11; Karpoff et al., supra note 11; Madanoglu & 
Karadag, supra note 44; Straska & Waller, supra note 10; Harford et al., supra note 49; Core et al., supra 
note 11; Adams & Ferreira, supra note 51; Bebchuk et al., Disappearing Association, supra note 11; Daines 
et al., supra note 52.  
152 See sources cited supra note 15. 
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incorporated companies. Here, we use computer processing of these documents to 
explore several other metrics.153  
Type-Token Ratios. The “Type-Token Ratio” (TTR) is a common metric that 
represents the ratio of unique terms divided by the total number of words in the 
document. This metric helps researchers understand a document’s repetitiveness and 
redundancy.  
We illustrate our TTR findings in Figure 7. The top two panels show the mean 
TTR for all charters that were in place in a given year, distinguishing between Delaware 
and non-Delaware issuers, and also subdividing between the full restatements only, 
and the complete set of effective charter documents in place in a given year (tacking 
on any partial amendments).154  
Our analysis shows that the overall TTR ratios of charters have generally declined 
over time under either measure. As was the case for changes in charter length and 
readability, most of this change has been outside of Delaware, with non-Delaware 
issuers converging with their Delaware counterparts by the end of our sample. This 
trend suggests that much of the growth in length of charters outside Delaware is 
accompanied by a greater tendency towards repetitiveness and/or redundancy. 
Syntactic Similarity. Another interesting machine-learning measure concerns inter-
document comparisons, which focus on assessing the similarity between two or more 
documents. It is unclear what trends to expect here: the increasing attention on 
“tailored” corporate governance regimes might lead one to predict that governance 
documents have grown less similar to one another over time. However, because 
shareholder activists, arbitrageurs, and proxy advisory firms—among others—have 
become more sophisticated in recent years, we might also expect that results lead in 
the other direction.  
One common technique in machine learning of assessing document similarity is 
to measure the extent to which a numerical representation of one document 
(represented by a mathematical vector) aligns with that of another document.155 Many 
anti-plagiarism and e-discovery algorithms use this approach, and it is often captured 
through a “cosine similarity” statistic that ranges from 0 (reflecting utter dissimilarity) 
 
153 The use of these techniques requires some preprocessing that is by now pretty standard in the 
field of computational text analysis. All measures presented below are based on the text of charters 
from which we stripped any content other than words as well as so-called stop words. After that, we 
used a technique called stemming to avoid treating simple inflected variations of words as different 
words. 
154 For more details on the treatment of piecemeal amendments within the corpus, see supra note 
108; infra Appendix B. 
155 Jeremy McClane, for example, has used this technique to consider the role of boilerplate in 
securities disclosure. See Jeremy McClane, Boilerplate and the Impact of Disclosure on Securities Dealmaking, 72 
VAND. L. REV. 191 (2019). 
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to 1 (reflecting complete similarity).156 We compute this measure and use a set of plots 
similar to Figure 7 to track it over the span of the CCG dataset.157 The Figure illustrates 
the mean cosine similarity of each charter document with the charter that is most 
similar to it during that same measuring year (its “nearest neighbor”). As shown in the 
figure, inter-document similarity has also grown discernibly during the span of the 
CCG dataset (both inside and outside of Delaware).158 




156 Cosine similarity is a popular similarity measure because it is independent of document length. 
157 We employed a standard set of computational text analysis transformations before making 
these computations. See infra notes 162-163 and accompanying text for greater elaboration.  
158 One potential explanation for the growth in similarity is the fact that the numbers of charters 
available in the CCG grows over time. However, this effect cannot fully explain the growth in similarity. 
Most importantly, while the numbers of charters of active companies peaked in 2006, similarity scores 
continue increasing after that. 
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Document measures such as these are helpful to explore industry- and firm-level 
characteristics. Do these types of measures reflect (or predict) attributes about the 
nature of the company’s business, size, and profitability? Table 4 highlights a variety 
of document measures across these three slices of the CCG. 
Table 4: Charter Content Means, by Industry, Asset Value & Tobin-Q  
Categories (Observations at the Firm-Year Level) 
 
Consider first how our corpus breaks down by industry. Here, the content of 
corporate charters appears to fluctuate considerably, both across industries and (in 
some cases) over time. Panel A reports on the mean of several of the metrics discussed 
above, but this time disaggregated across different 1-digit SIC sectors. Several 
characteristics stand out. Most notably, issuers in the Finance sector stand out across 
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all of the aforementioned measures: they are long (over 8,000 words on average), 
repetitive (scoring lowest on unique word ratios and type-token ratios) complex 
(scoring second lowest in F-K readability), and overall, quite similar (scoring highest 
in cosine similarity). On the other end of the spectrum, the service sector typically has 
charters that are relatively short, tailored, easy to read, and less emulatory. 
Larger companies are generally thought to be more complex, and Panel B of the 
Table bears this intuition out, disaggregating the population into size quartiles 
according to total asset value (as reported in the issuer’s 10K for the year observed). 
Remarkably, all four document metrics change monotonically as one moves through the 
size quartiles: larger firms have longer, less readable, more repetitive, and more 
emulatory charters on average than do their smaller counterparts. 
Panel C does something similar, but here we subdivide companies up into 
quartiles based on their Tobin’s-Q value each year, which is thought to measure the 
“value added” of the firm’s operation.159 Here, we once again see a trend that exhibits 
substantially the reverse monotonic relationships that we saw with asset value. Here, as we 
move into higher Q ratio quartiles, mean charter lengths decline, readability increases, 
and redundancy falls. There does not appear to be a strong trend in inter-document 
similarity, however. 
There is much more one can do with these sorts of measures. But even with this 
cursory appraisal, much real economic activity within firms leaves footprints in 
corporate governance documents (or perhaps vice versa). This observation suggests 
intriguing possibilities for researchers who wish to track whether and how a variety of 
political and economic phenomena (such as common ownership patterns) interact 
with the distribution of authority and control rights in firms. 
B. Latent Semantic Content 
A second exciting aspect of the CCG is its potential for unleashing a rich array of 
tools from computational textual analysis that allow deeper inquiry into document 
substance and structure.160 Below we report on a few such applications, relating to legal 
origins and sectoral effects, and we end by demonstrating how text analysis helps tell 
part of the story of the evolution of an industry during moments of upheaval.  
To the legal traditionalist, many of the tools we discuss below may seem (for want 
of a better term) un-lawyerly. After all, most of them begin by taking the texts of 
admittedly complex and nuanced legal documents, distilling them into numeric vector 
representations, and manipulating those representations to isolate “clusters” of 
 
159 The table uses the ratio of the issuer’s market value to its book value to measure Tobin’s Q. 
While not precisely equal to Q, the market/book ratio is a widely accepted approximation. See Tim 
Adam & Vidham K. Goyal, The Investment Opportunity Set and Its Proxy Variables, 31 J. FIN. RSCH. 41 
(2008). 
160 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 15. 
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affiliated or similar documents. While such mathematical renderings would seemingly 
be at odds with traditional legal analysis, these tools are surprisingly powerful and many 
parts of legal practice have long embraced computational techniques to augment 
traditional approaches.161 It is in that spirit that we employ them below. 
We transform each of the charters in our corpus into a vector representation 
based on the vocabulary used.162 Because our corpus allows us to observe firms’ 
charters multiple times, we develop two alternative representations, which we refer to 
as the “snapshot” and the “mashup” versions. The snapshot treats each year the 
company is publicly traded as a single observation, delivering a vector representation 
of the company’s charter as it existed on January 1 of that year. Consequently, any 
company observed over several years in our dataset will (by definition) be associated 
with several snapshots of its charter. The mashup combines the various snapshots 
together into a single composite for the company, taking the mean values of vector 
elements for years in which we observe snapshots.163 
In many applications (including ours), a vector representation of a document may 
have dozens, hundreds, or even thousands of dimensions—far too many to illustrate 
graphically. Nevertheless, the dimensions are derived using a technique designed to 
ensure that each successive dimension has diminishing explanatory power.164 
Consequently, by limiting attention to just the first two dimensions of our vectorized 
texts, we can retain the most important sources of variation while still enabling us to 
represent the “location” of each document in two-dimensional space. The panels of 
Figure 8 do just that, for the mashup versions of company charters. Charters that bear 
strong similarities to one another are located in close proximity, and accordingly if 
there are several mutually similar documents, they will tend to cluster in tight local 
neighborhoods; documents that are highly dissimilar, on the other hand, will be far 
apart, and several mutually dissimilar documents will scatter untidily about the plot, 
exhibiting no obvious clustering pattern. 
Even in this low dimensional setting, the panels from Figure 8 show discernible 
evidence of clustering—patterns that directly bear on whether jurisdiction and/or legal 
origins leave their marks on firm governance. The left panel of the figure utilizes color 
 
161 These include discovery and motion practice, transactional due diligence, and predicting 
outcomes of legal disputes. See sources cited supra note 15. 
162 More specifically, each document was distilled into a vector of ones and zeros depending on 
whether a word was featured in the document or not, and then rescaled using a familiar term-
frequency/inverse-document frequency (tf-idf) transformation. For details, see Frankenreiter & 
Livermore, supra note 15; Talley, supra note 15. 
163 More precisely, the mashup vector for each company consists of the averaged tf-idf scores 
across all observed years. There are, of course, other possibilities for combining documents, but we 
opted for this because of its ease of use and the fact that the main alternative (appending all years’ 
charters into a “mega-charter”) might introduce unwanted distortions. 
164 For a more detailed explanation, see Talley, supra note 15.  
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codings to differentiate between each company’s state of incorporation,165 and 
highlighting eight states that are well represented incorporation homes within our 
dataset.166  
Figure 8: Governance Clustering and State / Legal Origin (in 2-dim space) 
 
Several interesting features of the left-hand panel stand out. First, there appear to 
be relatively tight clustering patterns for many states, though this does not appear to 
be true categorically. An example of a state whose companies exhibit tight clustering 
is California, depicted with the dense colony of magenta dots on the right side of the 
panel. The fact that the charters of almost all public California companies fall into this 
tight neighborhood suggests that their charters are very similar to one another, and 
very dissimilar to the charters of companies incorporated elsewhere. Maryland, 
represented by forest green dots on the left side of the panel, shows an analogous 
pattern. Maryland has a considerable share of the incorporation market for real estate 
investment trusts, and virtually all of the Maryland issuers in this cluster are, in fact, 
REITs. 
California and Maryland’s patterns stand in stark contrast with New York, 
represented in dark blue. New York companies are scattered haphazardly with no 
strong pattern, suggesting comparably low levels of intra-state similarity. And, in some 
ways similar to New York, the dominant majority of Delaware incorporated firms in 
 
165 We tracked the incorporation date as of the date of filing, thereby picking issuers who 
reincorporated out of state. For such issuers, the Figure classifies them for which state they were 
incorporated in the longest amount of time. 
166 See Online Appendix D for a state-by-state breakdown. 
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our dataset (58% of the observations, depicted as black dots) also appear to sprawl 
entropically across all quadrants of the diagram, indicating substantial governance 
heterogeneity (at least as measured by the latent semantic content of chartering 
documents). 
The right-hand panel reproduces the identical geographical layout as the left-hand 
one, but it color-codes charters differently, based on the legal origin of the state’s 
corporate code. Here we subdivide issuers into three groups, depending on whether 
they are incorporated in Delaware (black dots), incorporated in states that adopted 
MBCA in substantial part (red dots), or (iii) incorporated neither in Delaware nor in 
any jurisdictions that embraced the MBCA (gray dots).167 In contrast to the right panel, 
there appears to be very little evidence that a common “legal origin” of the state’s 
corporate statute matters much for determining or predicting the contents of charters, 
at least as measured by whether the state built its law on the basis of the MBCA. Even 
the few apparent red clusters in MBCA states appear to be artifacts of intra-state 
clustering, since those same local neighborhoods are clearly associated with distinct 
states, such as Massachusetts and Virginia, in the left-hand panel. These figures are 
consistent with the view that state of incorporation can and often does shape the 
content of charters, but common statutory origin appears to have little if any 
explanatory power.168 
Another facet of the textual corpus is related to industry group effects. Figure 9 
once again reproduces the same two-dimensional representations from Figure 8 above, 
this time color coding by industry sector (at the 2-digit SIC group). Here, we see 
notable evidence of clustering for certain sectors, particularly in finance (pictured in 
red, once again channeling those Maryland REITs identified above) and 
manufacturing (which manifests several sub-sector clusters).169 This pattern is also 
consistent with Table 3, where recall that the finance sector was an outlier in all 
pertinent document metrics (length, readability, TTR, and cosine similarity). 
 
167 We impute MBCA legal origins from the 50-state survey produced by USLegal.com. See State 
Corporation Laws, USLEGAL, https://corporations.uslegal.com/basics-of-corporations/state-
corporation-laws/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2021).  
168 Cf. Jeffrey M. Gorris, Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Delaware Corporate Law and 
The Model Business Corporation Act: A Study in Symbiosis, 74 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 108 (2011) 
(“[T]here have been occasions on which [the MBCA’s] hallmark precision has impaired its utility as a 
model, and its assertions of superiority have been overblown”). In Online Appendix E, we report 
several additional analyses that investigate this question from different angles. None of these approaches 
provides any appreciable evidence that charters from two different jurisdictions sharing an MBCA 
origin would be more similar to each other than charters from that did not share this origin. 
169 In a separate set of robustness checks, we used a more general statistical test for whether the 
clustering of charters of companies from the same industry that can be observed in Figure 9 could be 
explained as a result of chance. The results from this analysis indicates that this is not the case. This 
result suggests that a firm’s corporate governance is at least partly a function of its area of business. 
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Figure 9: Governance Clustering by Industry (in 2-dim space) 
 
Although our focus thus far has been trained on the “mashup” versions of 
company charters (blending all years of a company’s charter), the snapshot versions of 
our corpus are also well situated to unlock interesting dynamic clues about how 
governance evolves over time. The transformation of the banking sector (a subset of 
the finance industry) during the Financial Crisis provides an interesting example of this 
story.170 Figure 10 illustrates diagrams similar to those above, but each is now 
separately generated for differing snapshot years (representing 2008, 2010, and 2012, 
respectively). Banks are represented with red dots,171 while all other companies are in 
gray. In 2008, the chartering contents of bank charters appeared far from 
homogenous, with few (if any) clustering neighborhoods. By 2010, however, this 
pattern changed dramatically, with a tight cluster of banks emerging—and this cluster 
clearly persisted into 2012. 
 
170 While governance studies no doubt feature prominently in the study of banking history, we are 
not aware of work that uses computational analysis to accomplish the task. Cf. Charles W. Calomiris & 
Mark Carlson, Corporate Governance and Risk Management at Unprotected Banks: National Banks in the 1890s, 
119 J. FIN. ECON. 512 (2016) (analyzing the impact of corporate governance structure on banking policy 
and practice in the 1890s). 
171 I.e., SIC code 60.  
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Figure 10: Transformation of Bank Governance During the Financial Crisis 
 
It does not take a rocket scientist (or rocket-science attorney) to make an educated 
guess as to why bank charters began clustering at this moment in time. In October 
2008, the United States government interceded at the height of the financial crisis, 
infusing Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds into the coffers of dozens of 
large and medium-sized banks. These infusions typically took the form preferred 
equity purchases that gave the government considerable shareholder rights—rights 
that were formally recorded at some point in early 2009; accordingly, insofar as they 
affect the text of corporate charters (as new share issues must), they largely show up 
in the CCG on January 1, 2010 (depicted in the middle panel). Since the US 
government was effectively a large and powerful horizontal shareholder across 
multiple banks, it is not surprising that TARP administrators used that power in 
bargaining, so that the basic terms and conditions of the preferred share issuances 
stayed relatively uniform. Indeed, many bank recipients of TARP funds simply inserted 
a verbatim version of a standard provision into their corporate charters, resulting in a 
discernible clustering of charters within this industry.172 As the recipient banks 
progressively paid off their TARP investments and left the program, this clustering 
pattern steadily began to dissipate, and it had largely disappeared by 2018.  
Although computational text analysis is surely overkill for documenting the 
banking sector’s well-known transformation during the Financial Crisis, it is 
comforting to see that a tool seemingly as blunt as document vectorization (into two 
 
172 The dark red cluster in the middle and right panel of Figure 10 includes the following firms: 
Bank of America; First Financial Bancorp; Firstmerit Corp; BB&T Corp; Fifth Third Bancorp; Suntrust 
Banks Inc; Old National Bancorp; First Midwest Bancorp; Keycorp; Umpqua Holdings Corp; Valley 
National Bancorp; and M&T Bank Corp. According to ProPublica, all these banks at one point received 
TARP money, and 10 of the 12 were among the first beneficiaries of the government’s equity purchase 
program in late 2008. See Bailout Tracker: Bailout Recipients, PROPUBLICA, 
https://projects.propublica.org/bailout/list (last updated Nov. 9, 2020). 
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dimensions, no less) can still capture a notorious wave of governance convergence. 
Perhaps more exciting is the use of these and similar techniques to tease out other, less 
clear-cut evolutionary trajectories. For example, there is now a growing and 
controversial literature positing a provocative circumstantial argument suggesting that 
passive investing is anticompetitive, since it results in large common/horizontal 
ownership in the ownership blocks held by index funds across sectors. Several of the 
combatants in this area have raised important questions about identifying the causal 
mechanism (if any) that converts common ownership into oligopolistic power (e.g., 
compensation, lobbying, intra-firm governance, etc.).173 A natural way to test whether 
common ownership affects governance might attempt to measure if and to what 
extent the emergence of common / horizontal ownership blocks also predicts patterns 
of convergence in the content of governance documents (such as charters and bylaws). 
C. Supervised Learning Tools 
Our textual corpus and labels are not only interesting for their descriptive 
applications: They also allow us to make some predictions. For example, as companies 
continue to file charters over time, they add to the corpus, and we can then use our 
labels to train a machine-learning classifier to quickly label the new filings. Doing so 
not only allows us to absorb the new additions into our database more quickly, but it 
also facilitates error detection and correction in all our existing labels (a task we have 
already implemented in part for this paper). Moreover, future researchers will also be 
able to use our corpus to generate new labels, indices, and evaluative metrics that are 
not currently part of any major governance data collection enterprise, including 
features such as forum selection provisions, board diversity provisions, stakeholder 
provisions, and the like.  
Although space limitations preclude us from demonstrating the full range of the 
conceivable supervised-learning applications, one that is directly relevant to our 
analysis above concerns our evaluation of the G-Index and corrections thereto 
embodied in the CCG-Index. As discussed in Part II, the components of the G-Index 
continue jointly and severally to be used by corporate governance researchers to 
inform critical academic and policy debates. Because those components are 
purportedly derived in large part from governance documents themselves, our corpus 
(and labels) should bear a natural relationship to them, effectively allowing us to use 
the CCG database to “predict” the G-Index score. Similarly, our corpus can also allow 
us to predict the CCG-Index, giving us an indirect measure of the fidelity of each index 
to underlying governance documents and statutory structure. 
To explore these possibilities, we used each of the G-Index and CCG-Index to 
calibrate a machine learning classifier, generating predicted values of each index based 
solely on the semantic content of our corpus of charters and their associated labels. We 
took care to use identical, well-established estimation techniques to calibrate each 
 
173 See supra notes 17-18. 
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classifier.174 The performance of our classifiers against their “target” index is depicted 
in the scatter-plot panels of Figure 11, with the G-Index on the left and the CCG-
Index on the right. Our calibrated classifier for the G-Index works reasonably well, 
successfully predicting 45% of the variation in the index.175 In some respects, this result 
bolsters one’s confidence that the G-index reflects something about company-level 
governance choices as manifested in the charter (as it purports to do). By the same 
token, the classifier fails to predict the remaining 55% of the variation in the G-Index. 
Based solely on this analysis, one cannot tell how much of the prediction noise is due 
to (a) a limitation on what such classifiers can offer, or (b) inaccurate labeling of the 
underlying data used to formulate the G-Index.  
The right panel uses the identical approach, but this time as applied to the 
predicted and actual values of the CCG-Index. It is immediately clear that this classifier 
also has good predictive power. More than good, in fact: the CCG-Index predictions 
are a much tighter fit than those of the G-index, and the scatter-plot “cloud” is 
substantially more centered around our prediction line. Indeed, calibrating to the 
CCG-Index substantially increases our predictive power, from 45% to 69% of the variance 
in the respective indices. Put another way, when compared to the G-Index predictions, our 
CCG-Index predictions are more accurate by half, a result that is consistent with the 
conclusion that our corrections indeed remediated substantial coding errors in the G-
Index.176 
 
174 For the technically-minded reader, we deployed lasso regressions on the principal components 
of the vectorized texts to generate all predicted values. This approach counteracts over-fitting risks by 
imposing a multiplicative penalty (λ>0) on the sum of the absolute value of estimated coefficients. It 
thus automatically shrinks the set of non-zero coefficients, retaining only the most explanatory ones. In 
our case, the penalty parameter (λ) was calibrated to minimize the sum of squared residuals in a 10-fold 
cross-validation, and the resulting coefficients were then used to generate predicted values as described 
in the text. For more on this utterly scintillating technique, see Robert Tibshirani, Regression Shrinkage and 
Selection via the Lasso, 58 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y: SERIES B(METHODOLOGICAL) 267 (1996). 
175 We reiterate that all predicted values were generated on an “out-of-sample” basis using a 10-
fold cross-validation: the documents were split into ten arbitrary groups, and for each group the model 
was calibrated using only the remaining nine partitions, rendering predictions for the held-out group. 
176 Because the CCG-Index corrections were themselves based on a direct labeling of the raw 
corpus, the alert reader might wonder whether a trained classifier would fare better for purely 
mechanical reasons in predicting the CCG-Index. We discount this concern on both conceptual and 
statistical grounds. First, the above approach constitutes a reasonable way to ascertain the reliability of 
our labeling protocols (described at length in Appendix B) against those used to assemble the IRRC 
(described nowhere). The G-index is purportedly based on the same documents and statutory structures 
as is our CCG-Index; and thus if the IRRC were labeled correctly to begin with, our scatter plots 
manifest trivial differences in predictive power (rather than a nearly 25-percentage-point difference in 
R2). Second, in a separate robustness check (see Online Appendix F), we stripped out our labels 
completely, training the text classifiers solely with the raw textual content of corporate charters. While 
both predictors degrade, the same qualitative result still holds: our classifier explains substantially more 
variation in the CCG-Index (44.4%) than it does in the G-Index (34.5%). 
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Figure 11: ML Predictions of G-Index (Left) & CCG-Index (Right)177 
 
IV. Implications and the Road Ahead 
For many readers, this article may prove to be something of a Pandora’s box: 
Most immediately, it problematizes several corporate governance “folk wisdoms” that 
have long been considered settled—including a result so beatified in the literature that 
it has achieved slogan status: that good governance translates into good returns. Using 
a deliberately conservative error-correction protocol, we demonstrated not only that 
the field’s standard metrics for good governance appear grossly inaccurate, but also 
that the connection between governance and investment returns is materially sketchier 
than previously thought. Governance may yet matter, but the case for it far less clear 
than we thought it was.178  
We still do not know the full implications of the errors our analysis has begun to 
uncover. Hundreds of studies have incorporated GIM’s results or made use of the 
same questionable data. The various competitor indices are notable examples,179 but 
there are scores of others that use the data or indices as inputs and/or controls in their 
own empirical designs.180 Regulators, too, have turned to GIM and its progeny to 
support a litany of governance reforms.181 Even critics of governance indices have 
largely presumed that the underlying data are accurate.182 As a result, errors in popular 
 
177 Univariate OLS regression estimates of Predicted on Observed G-Index and CCG-Index 
overlaid on each panel. Significance: * = 0.05; **=0.01; ***=0.001.  
178 Moreover, any more aggressive correction to data errors—including the addition of bylaw data 
and expanded firm-level matching—might well cause further attenuation. 
179 See Bebchuk et al., What Matters, supra note 11; Madanoglu & Karadag, supra note 44; Karpoff 
et al., supra note 11. 
180 See supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text. 
181 See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text. 
182 See supra note 54. 
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governance datasets have plausibly propagated throughout much of the corporate 
governance universe, affecting law, policy, practice, and theory. Reexamining the 
robustness of these results with more accurate data is a monumental undertaking that 
can only feasibly be spread across many years and several researchers. 
Our Pandora’s box also renders two ominous caveats about the critical 
importance of data availability and the vital role of lawyers in legal empiricism. As to 
the former, there is significant corporate governance data out there and free for the 
taking, but accessing it in usable form is fraught with difficulty. Simply put, the task of 
finding, harvesting, and cleaning fundamental governance documents for thousands 
of companies over three decades is hard work. The most amenable source—the SEC’s 
quirky EDGAR online filing system—is cumbersome and poorly organized (especially 
for this task). State regulators are even less helpful, often requiring travel to a physical 
repository, only to face antiquated extraction technologies and exorbitant access fees. 
The small number of third-party commercial purveyors also charge fees, throttle 
downloading activity, and zealously protect their investments with litigation threats. 
Even for us—motivated though we were—pulling off this enterprise literally required 
a worldwide pandemic in the summer of 2020, which destabilized the economy and 
unexpectedly made available dozens of highly qualified research assistants.183 
It is difficult to understand why public access to public records should be so 
tough.184 The end result has been to make comprehensive governance research 
accessible only to the most well-heeled, well-connected, and patient—an observation 
that itself sounds a dissonant note about the uneven intellectual and economic playing 
field. Until now, the rest of us hoi polloi have been largely left to make do with the same 
small number of commercial resources, whose reliability has always been a little 
suspect, and which we have now shown to be hamstrung with inaccuracies.185 
The second systemic caveat from our analysis concerns the surprisingly critical 
role of lawyers in empirical research. Although we cannot know for sure, our results 
strongly suggest that whoever originally labeled the dominant extant corporate 
governance databases had limited (if any) legal training. Our educated guess is that 
much of it was coded by non-lawyers. This approach—while no doubt economical—
has a significant and unfortunate shortcoming: As we have shown above, turning 
corporate governance texts into quantitative data is a big ask. It requires nuanced 
 
183 See infra Appendix A. 
184 Corporate governance documents are only one example of such hurdles. See, e.g., Pah et al., 
supra note 21 (chronicling restrictions of the PACER system over federal judicial records). 
185 As noted above, commercial data providers provide two types of data: data scraped from the 
SEC, or independently gathered and coded data with little to no information about the gathering and 
coding process (the IRRC and ISS datasets). The former imports whatever inaccuracies were in the SEC 
data onto a new platform, while layering on a theoretically easier-to-use search function. But while these 
search functions improve upon the SEC’s, they invariably miss important bits of information, which 
makes data gathered through these types of databases almost certainly incomplete. 
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domain knowledge, legal judgment, and familiarity with broader principles of law and 
regulation. Nonlawyers, almost by definition, possess few of these skills. 
And therein lies the rub: Lawyers, a professional class defined largely by a 
common aversion to numbers, appear long ago to have surrendered the project of 
corporate governance data collection to others. This was a mistake. In our opinion, 
the time is long past for lawyers to shed our quantitative heebeegeebees, roll up our 
sleeves, and reclaim the field of corporate governance research (including the data bit).  
While our Pandora’s box unleashes some admittedly negative mojo, it also 
contains a substantial beacon of hope. The versatility and open-source accessibility of 
the CCG database holds considerable promise for unlocking future chapters of 
corporate governance discourse along multiple dimensions. For example, recent years 
have seen a burgeoning attention to the societal role of corporations, the role for non-
shareholder constituencies in corporate governance, and the alternatives to a 
shareholder primacy view of corporate law. A common rejoinder to the 
stakeholderism movement is cost: that stakeholderism chases marginal or unproven 
benefits while sacrificing the returns that shareholder primacy is widely known to 
create.186 If such widely known folk wisdoms are, in fact, the vestiges of inaccurate 
data (as we have argued), then this cost-based rejoinder packs a considerably punier 
punch. More generally, when armed with our open-source resource, empirically-
minded corporate governance researchers will be far better equipped to explore both 
conventional and emergent corporate governance questions. 
Even more promising is the potential for the CCG to transform fundamentally 
the way we “do” corporate governance research writ large. Our corpus is a critical 
ingredient for harnessing novel techniques from computational text analysis and 
machine learning, and then applying them to our understanding of how firms are 
organized. Already, machine learning is fueling exciting results in many legal 
domains187—and we believe that corporate governance is an especially availing (yet still 
relatively untapped) target. Marshaling these new techniques to complement more 
traditional methodologies can lead to better empirical understanding, better theory, 
and better policy. Our discussion above merely scratches the surface of what can be 
accomplished with these techniques. 
Almost as important is the fact that the CCG is effectively future-proof. While 
the most popular corporate governance datasets today consist solely of (questionable) 
data labels, we provide the underlying textual inputs themselves—the very DNA of 
corporate governance. This raw textual corpus will empower future researchers to 
expand the breadth of existing labeled datasets, to correct mistakes in existing ones 
 
186 See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel & Roberto Tallarita, For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain? 
(working paper), 93 S. Cal. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2021), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3677155; Lucian Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, 
The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance, CORNELL L. REV.  (forthcoming 2021). 
187 See sources cited supra note 15. 
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(including ours), and to devise novel analytic measures to take on as-yet-unknown 
questions. The possibilities are endless, and the potential for intellectual payoff 
appreciable. With the CCG database, moreover, we all will have a running start. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we have unveiled the fruits of a multi-year effort to harvest, clean, 
organize, and make publicly available (for the first time) a corpus of foundational 
corporate governance documents spanning three decades and thousands of public 
companies. We have demonstrated the immediate value of this resource by combining 
it with carefully hand-labeled data, which we then used to uncover a disconcerting 
pattern of errors within the most widely used corporate governance datasets among 
researchers. And those inaccuracies are consequential: Even after imposing a 
deliberately conservative error correction protocol, we have shown that some of the 
most well-known metrics and empirical insights in the field stand on shaky ground. 
In the light of these findings, one might reasonably ask whether we should 
reassess our claim—made at the onset of this article—that empirical corporate 
governance is a major success story in the interdisciplinary study of law.188 In our view, 
no such reappraisal is warranted. To the contrary: notwithstanding the appreciable 
infirmity of existing data that we have unearthed, as well as the corresponding state of 
flux it visits upon well-known folk wisdoms of the field, we view our project as 
ultimately standing on the shoulders of those early efforts. Those contributions 
permanently changed the conversation about how to understand corporate 
governance on a broad scale. In bringing this new resource into the public domain, 
our ultimate goal (and our accomplishment) is to lay the foundation for advancing the 
empirical corporate governance project even further. By providing a clean, accessible, 
primary data source going to the very structure of corporate governance, our project 
helps to provide a critical resource for unleashing new tools from machine learning 
and text analysis, taking corporate governance research into its next chapter. 
And yet, much of the current chapter is still being written. Although our 
contribution makes a marked improvement over the status quo, we are neither so 
prideful or nor so delusional to believe our offering cannot be improved upon. Though 
relatively comprehensive, our corpus does not include all companies or all conceivable 
measurement years. It is likely that we have missed at least some relevant texts even 
for those issuers we track. And, notwithstanding our collaborative judgments as legal 
scholars, others will quibble with our calls about how to label certain elements of the 
corpus. All that said, the open-source nature of the CCG transforms each of these 
bugs into features: We invite all corporate governance researchers, professional or 
 
188 See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text. 
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academic, expert or dilettante, U.S.-based or foreign, quant or poet, to contribute to 
this resource, helping each other collectively to cultivate it further.189 
We also anticipate that the scope of our own task will expand. As monumental as 
the present undertaking has proven, our efforts have tackled only select (albeit 
important) pieces of the corporate governance ecosystem. In ongoing work, we have 
already begun to take on other foundational governance domains, including bylaws, 
shareholder agreements, board resolutions, and the like. Each presents an opportunity 
to correct past mistakes, to deploy new computational tools, to push the boundaries 
of knowledge, and (most fundamentally) to clean corporate governance for good.  
 
189 Upon publication, we will enable interested researchers to make use of the corpus and to 
develop improvements to the CCG database, transforming it into a living resource. The use and 
adaptation of the corpus will be free of charge, and subject to the Creative Commons Share-Alike 
License (v. 4.0),  see Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International, CREATIVE COMMONS, 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode (last visited Feb. 10, 2021). 
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190 Appendices C, D, E and F are available at www.publiccompanycharters.com. 
191 Senior Research assistants were JD students or recent JD graduates at top law schools. 
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Appendix B: Data Collection and Cleaning Protocols 
This Appendix provides further details about our process for building the panel-
structured chartering corpus for the CCG database, as well as our labeling protocols. 
We subdivide our description into (1) locating charters; (2) text extraction; (3) charter 
content labeling; and (4) state law content labeling. 
1. Locating Charters (Task 1) 
Our dataset consists of all charters available on EDGAR for all companies that 
fulfill at least one of the two following alternative criteria.  
• The company was part of the S&P 1500 in any year between 2010 and 
2019.  
• The company is in the IRRC database for at least three out of the 
following five years of coverage in the IRRC: 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 
2006.193 
For any issuer satisfying at least one of these inclusion criteria we attempt to 
extract the most complete chartering history available (even for years not satisfying the 
above criteria). Applying these criteria, we compile a list of 2,899 companies. For all 
companies in our dataset, we obtain all of their current and historical charters available 
on Edgar, and extract, clean and organize their text.  
To ensure accuracy in our collection and avoid the pitfalls of some of the current 
commercial data, we tackle this challenge manually, with the help of a large number of 
research assistants. Our protocol for locating relevant texts leverages the requirement 
for companies to include information about their corporate charters with their annual 
10-K filing.194 These filings usually do not contain the text of the charter themselves, 
but instead incorporate the charter by reference to one or more prior filings, typically 
filed shortly after the charter was adopted/amended. Our harvesting protocol 
therefore follows a sequential process: (1) locate the company’s most recent annual 
10-K filing; (2) determine whether the filing reproduces a full charter restatement or 
merely incorporates one by reference; and (3) if no full restatement is found, use the 
exhibit references to identify the dates and locations of prior filings that contain the 
 
193 The ISS Legacy/IRRC database does not cover all years, but instead it observes S&P 1500 
issuers periodically, in 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006. EDGAR filings were 
voluntary in 1995, and they did not become compulsory until May 1996. For a history of EDGAR’s 
roll-out, see History of EDGAR, EDGAR PRO, https://help.edgar-
online.com/edgar/history.asp?site=pro#:~:text=In%201984%2C%20the%20SEC%20allocated,get%
20the%20information%20it%20needed (last visited Feb. 10, 2021). Our data collection effort required 
at least three years of IRRC coverage to focus on issuers that could generate a reasonably reliable panel 
structure, and we omitted from our search the first three years of the IRRC’s coverage (1990, 1993, 
1995) since those years pre-dated the full roll-out of the SEC’s EDGAR service (our primary data 
collection source). 
194 15 U.S.C. § 78(m). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3796628
Cleaning Corporate Governance 
 
59 
full text of the current charter as well as any intervening amendments.195 Once those 
new texts are located and added to our database, the search protocol repeats, with the 
next iteration starting with the 10-K filing that immediately precedes the filing date of 
the full restated charter located from the prior iteration. For each issuer, we loop 
through these sequential steps repeatedly, working backwards in time until the trail 
runs cold and no more responsive documents can be located on EDGAR.196 We spot-
checked several companies’ charters against inventory lists from commercial providers 
to confirm that our manual collection efforts avoided the aforementioned coverage 
gaps that befall commercial providers (they substantially do).  
Work on this part of the project started in October 2019; overlapping cohorts of 
research assistants and law students assisted us in different periods of time, but we 
were fortunate enough to bridge the transition periods with high-quality legacy 
personnel to help train the next group. We harvested most of the chartering histories 
for companies in the current S&P 1500 in October/November 2019. Information 
obtained by research assistants during this phase of the project was later verified by a 
different set of research assistants—all assignments that were not completed by either 
senior RAs or the coauthors underwent this procedure. Information for companies 
that were not part of the S&P 1500 at the time of the start of the project was assembled 
starting in the summer of 2020. In this part of the project, we assigned the majority of 
companies to two research assistants at the same time. In case the information 
provided by the research assistants was not identical, we sent the information to a third 
research assistant for verification. 
2. Text Extraction (Task 2) 
In a second step, we use the information obtained from Task 1 to extract the texts 
of charters from EDGAR. For this, we employ a custom-made python script. This 
process allows us to gather charter texts for around 80% of the charters we identify in 
Task 1. For the remaining 20%, research assistants retrieve the text manually. 
3. Charter Content Labeling (Task 3) 
The third step involves labeling the contents of charters according to a 
prespecified coding rubric. Our rubric contains a set of 28 questions about the 
presence of specific provisions in a charter. Ten questions deal with issues regarding 
the rights associated with different classes of stock and the power of the board to shift 
the balance of power among shareholders, in particular in the context of takeover 
defenses. Another 10 questions concern issues of corporate governance (such as 
 
195 The recorded information also included helpful document text tags, which allowed us to 
develop a customized computer program to extract the charter texts. In cases where this automated text 
extraction failed, we extracted the text manually. 
196 As a result, our strategy materially differs from (and is more robust than) the approach 
apparently used by most commercial services. See supra Part I. More details of our training protocol for 
tracking filed charters and amendments is given in Appendix B.  
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special meetings and written consents). A final set of questions concerns the liability 
of managers and corporate officers. For each of these questions, we ask coders to 
provide us not just with a binary response if the provision was present, but also with 
relevant text if they are able to locate a provision in the charter. 
We implemented this rubric in an Excel spreadsheet that allows us to code the 
contents of charters for the same company on one sheet. We also make available to 
coders “redline” documents that show the changes between different versions of (full 
restatements of) corporate charters. Our research assistant team convened once per 
week via Zoom to discuss the labeling process and to tackle any issues that occurred 
during the previous week. Besides, we set up an online forum where coders had the 
opportunity to ask questions on an ongoing basis, and that was consistently monitored 
by one of the senior RAs. 
Initially, we assigned the same company to multiple coders in order to track 
agreement rates and identify the need for additional training. After that, we assigned 
companies to two research assistants at the same time. Senior research assistants 
reviewed all questions for which the coders’ answers diverged. During this phase of 
the project, we also tracked rates of agreements between coders. After some weeks, 
we ceased double-assigning companies to JD research assistants. For other research 
assistants whose coding appeared particularly reliable, we also incrementally reduced 
the amount of overlap with other coders. However, we made sure that at least 33% of 
the companies coded by undergrad coders were double-assigned. Overall, we labeled 
the contents of all the charters for 1,573 issuers in our dataset. The companies included 
in Task 3 were chosen as follows. Because one of the goals of our manual coding was 
to replicate studies relying on the IRRC database, we deviated from random 
assignment in one important way: Whenever possible, we gave priority to companies 
that were included in the IRRC database. 
4. State Law Content Labeling (Task 4) 
In a separate effort, we trained business law students to label a panel data set of 
laws from all 50 states and the District of Columbia regarding sixteen governance-
related issues. 197 (Several of these dimensions appear to have been wrongly neglected 
in notable databases like the IRRC.)  
For state law, labelers tabulated the existence and substantive directionality of the 
provision (e.g., “required” or “not required/silent”), whether it was a default or 
immutable rule, the lowest echelon of corporate governance document capable of 
contracting out of the rule (if it was default), and limitations / constraints placed on 
available choices for issuers opting out (again if it was a default). These criteria were 
then employed to implement the “conservative” approach to identifying and 
correcting errors. Our state-level panel data also includes labels for four additional 
 
197 For additional details, see Online Appendices. 
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state law provisions that we extracted from pre-existing assorted sources in the 
literature.198 Although we did not label these de novo, when the designations in the 
literature conflicted with one another we did primary research to reconcile the 
differences. 
 
198 Karpoff et al., supra note 11; Matthew D. Cain, Stephen B. McKeon & Steven Davidoff 
Solomon, Do Takeover Laws Matter? Evidence from Five Decades of Hostile Takeovers, 124 J. FIN. ECON. 464 
(2017); Michal Barzuza & David Smith, What Happens in Nevada? Self-Selecting into Lax Law, 27 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 3593 (2014).  
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